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Abstract 
This project investigates the effectiveness of Contingency Contracting 
Officers (CCOs) in executing construction requirements within the United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).  The study 
provides recommendations to address identified weaknesses associated with a 
CCO’s ability to execute construction requirements for USSOCOM.  One such 
recommendation is the development of a Construction Management Module (CM2) 
to better manage the contingency contracting process for construction requirements.  
This module will employ a synergistic approach (integrating joint capabilities) to 
planning and executing construction requirements in the USSOCOM contingency 
AOR. 
Keywords:   Expeditionary contracting, contingency contracting, construction 
management, training, USSOCOM operations, synergy, integration, joint 
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Executive Summary 
As a leader in front-line asymmetric threat operations, USSOCOM has 
increased its presence around the world in support of military and national security 
objectives.  Its mission demands flexibility and adaptability at the highest extent 
allowable under the law.  CCOs supporting this mission are often looked upon as 
logistics facilitators, business advisors, resource managers, and general tactical 
experts in achieving contractual requirements and arrangements supporting the 
USSOCOM mission.  As key enablers of this mission, CCOs are often asked to fulfill 
construction contract requirements in austere locations with little or no training in 
construction terminology and concepts.  This lack of expertise has posed a problem 
for the command.  This study provides strategic and tactical recommendations to 
address identified problems areas, such as: proper training and manning of 
personnel, inadequate acquisition planning and contract management processes, 
and a lack of integration among a splintered platform of  cross-functional 
stakeholders.  As part of the tactical recommendation, the researcher also 
developed a Construction Management Module to improve specific problems 
realized with inadequate acquisition planning, insufficient oversight of work, and a 
failure to include the appropriate funding considerations, clauses and evaluation 

























This chapter introduces the background, problem statement, and research 
elements associated with this project.  As a leader in front-line asymmetric threat 
operations, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has increased 
its presence around the world in support of global operations against terrorist 
networks and other military and national security objectives.  The USSOCOM 
mission demands flexibility and adaptability at the highest extent allowable under the 
law.  Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) are often looked upon as logistics 
facilitators, business advisors, resource managers, and general tactical experts in 
achieving contractual requirements and arrangements supporting the USSOCOM 
mission.  As key enablers of this mission, CCOs are often asked to fulfill construction 
requirements in austere locations with little or no training in construction terminology, 
concepts, and protocols.  This lack of expertise has posed a problem for the 
command.  This chapter presents this problem and outlines the subsequent 
research to illustrate the need for the creation of a construction management 
module.  
B. Background 
The command mission for USSOCOM is to provide fully capable Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) to defend the United States (US) and its interests while 
conducting synchronized planning of global operations against terrorist networks 
(Cannaday, 2008).  The USSOCOM commander uses the Center for Special 
Operations Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL) to provide rapid and focused 
acquisition, technology, and logistics support to the SOF warfighter.  SOAL is 
recognized as a “key enabler” of the USSCOM global mission.  The Directorate of 
Procurement (DoP) within SOAL acquires SOF-peculiar weapon systems, 
equipment, services, and construction in direct support of SOF Overseas 
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To meet this challenging mission, the Director of Procurement utilizes the 
most innovative, streamlined, and expedited acquisition practices available, while 
maintaining strict compliance with required statutes and regulations.  It is important 
for USSOCOM contracting personnel to rapidly execute objectives in an ever-
changing joint battle-space.  These assets often come from contracting 
organizations throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) that must quickly adapt 
to the USSOCOM mission and policies.  The increasing role of contingency 
contracting in austere conditions demands a more agile and skilled workforce.  The 
current operations tempo around the globe has resulted in both a growing number of 
bare-base initiatives with emergency requirements and continued sustainment of the 
existing infrastructure for our deployed forces.  As a matter of prudent resource 
management and risk mitigation, more mature, sustainment-oriented environments 
in the contingency Area of Responsibility (AOR) must withstand increasing scrutiny 
and must meet higher expectations of statutory and regulatory compliance than that 
of bare-base environments in an immature AOR.   
In order to meet these higher expectations, the DoP requested this study to 
determine how to better enable the mission effectiveness of USSOCOM CCOs while 
they are achieving this compliance and supporting strategic objectives.  The focus of 
this study concerns enabling the CCOs to more effectively execute construction 
requirements in a contingency (expeditionary) environment through a practical, yet 
comprehensive, management module that facilitates the respective mission 
objectives.  
C. Problem Statement 
Through the NPS Acquisition Research Program, USSOCOM leadership 
expressed a need for a management module that would enable its CCOs to better 
execute expeditionary infrastructure requirements.  In order to appropriately craft 
such a module, the researcher must analyze the existing operational environment to 
determine which content and focus areas need to be addressed.   CCOs supporting 
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larger regional or theatre-wide contracting centers.  They are also under the 
Operational Control (OPCON) of other agencies and commands within the AOR.  
This situation presents a unique dynamic in which a CCO must use the regulations 
and contract authority of one specific command, while supporting the operational 
objectives of another particular geographical combatant commander on the ground.   
A cross-functional and joint-force environment further compounds this 
problem because different military services and functional areas are accustomed to 
their own regulations, procedures, doctrines, and objectives.  The interaction of 
these various forces can be combined to create an effect greater than the sum of 
their individual effects. In other words, cooperative interaction among the individual 
cross-functional and joint-force members can create enhanced effectiveness greater 
than the sum of their individual effectiveness. This phenomenon will be referred to 
throughout this report as synergy.   A more synergistic approach to how CCOs 
manage requirements is needed to effectively integrate the capabilities of both the 
joint-force environment and cross-functional areas of the acquisition team (such as 
finance, engineering, legal, logistics, and the operational unit requesting contractual 
support). Creating this synergy is not easy; CCOs need a structured management 
process to bridge the gaps between their respective military services’ training 
doctrine and their individual skills, as well as the expectations of commanders on the 
ground.  This report found that some of the biggest effectiveness gaps that arise 
when CCOs are executing construction requirements include: inadequate training of 
personnel, confusing contract management policies and construction management 
standards, non-compliant contracts (e.g., a failure to include the appropriate clauses 
and drawings, deficient acquisition planning and integration of contracting into 
operational planning, insufficient oversight of work and poor interaction between 
units).   
Construction requirements often are dynamic and more complex than 
simplified commodity purchases; they demand frequent integration and close 
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troubled by the unpredictability of contingency environments and the speed of war.  
A construction management module focused on integrating the joint-force 
environment will allow even a relatively inexperienced CCO to better manage his/her 
environment and more effectively support SOF. 
D. Research Questions 
The specific research questions for this study include the following:  
(1) What are the gaps in the effectiveness of contingency contracting with 
respect to executing construction requirements? 
(2) Can a comprehensive management module be developed to 
effectively mitigate these gaps? If so, what would it entail? 
E. Research Objectives 
This project has two primary goals:  
(1) Examine the contingency contracting environment concerning 
expeditionary construction requirements.  
(2) Provide recommendations to address problems in the field. Among 
these will be the development, creation, and delivery of a prototype 
tactical training handbook for CCOs to better manage the contingency 
contracting process for construction requirements, known herein as the 
USSOCOM Construction Management Module (CM2). 
F. Research Methodology 
Practical, qualitative research was conducted using multiple methods. The 
foundation for planning this overall research project—determining the research 
questions and selecting subsequent sources—followed a mixed application of 
fundamental research concepts outlined by many different sources (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994;, Taylor & Bogdan, 1998; Marshall & Rossman, 
1998; Creswell, 2003; Leedy & Ormond, 2005; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
The researcher analyzed archival data, such as governmental reports, 
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Additionally, the researcher collected data using questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews with key informants. Informants were made up of USSOCOM personnel 
and supporting SMEs, selected from individuals with diverse backgrounds and 
experience.  These informants were selected from current USSOCOM CCOs, staff, 
and customers.  Questionnaires were developed, and interviews were conducted 
using standard operating procedures approved by the NPS Institutional Review 
Board for the study of human subjects.  Using data from the literature and informant 
feedback, the researcher compared and contrasted successes and failures 
documented throughout contingency contracting.  This data was processed 
predominately using the Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate 
(ADDIE) model with a rapid, prototyping approach (Strickland, 2006).    The ADDIE 
method was used to apply principles, processes, and designs for self-instruction 
(Keirns, 1999).  Additionally, the ARCS motivation model (Keller, 1984) was used to 
focus on the attention, relevance, confidence, and satisfaction of the CM2 reader. 
In an effort to clearly organize the collected data, the analysis (Chapter V) 
and subsequent strategic recommendations (Chapter VI) are organized into three 
overarching categories: people, processes, and platforms.  These categories are 
used herein to represent strategic pillars of planning and executing joint operational 
contracting activities.  The CM2 prototype is intended for use by the tractical-level 
CCO during contingency operations.  It was, therefore, organized in a manner to 
match that of typical contracting structure: operational framework, strategic 
alignment, pre-award, award, post-award.     
G. Significance of Research 
Anticipated benefits from this study include a current overview of existing 
problems faced by USSOCOM construction CCOs and recommendations to resolve 
or mitigate those problems—including a Construction Management Module to be 
distributed to future CCOs.  Although a broad contingency contracting handbook 
titled Contingency Contracting—A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century exists, it does 
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operating environment of the USSOCOM AOR.  Up to this point, it has been unclear 
as to exactly what gaps in capabilities and knowledge currently exist in the field.  By 
interviewing contracting officers, staff officials, end-users, and other SMEs, the 
researcher hopes to identify and address effective ways to mitigate these gaps. 
H. Scope, Limitations and Assumptions 
This research is focused on construction requirements in contingency 
contracting within USSOCOM.  Although it will review the overall USSOCOM 
mission and contingency contracting concepts, trends, challenges, and capabilities 
for comprehensive background and context, this research will not evaluate a sample 
representation of the population of all CCOs or all SOF personnel.  Feedback from 
respondents is limited to USSOCOM-related contingencies and may not address 
current issues outside this scope.    
The following assumptions/disclaimers pertain to this report: 
1. Research was conducted throughout 2009.  It is not intended as an 
exclusive solution to long-term operational needs and must be 
evaluated and updated accordingly over time.  Future evaluation 
procedures and methods are addressed in the final recommendations 
in Chapter VI.  
 
2. The term construction as used herein includes materials, supplies, and 
real property alterations associated with building or rebuilding 
infrastructure—including some services used in support of establishing 
infrastructure.  
 
3. The models and information addressed are to be used as a theoretical 
foundation or guide and shall not overrule any current or future laws, 
regulations, or policy.   
 
4. DoD contracting and SOF professionals of various positions with 
diverse backgrounds comprise the sample for questionnaires and 
interviews.  Results of feedback may or may not reflect overall 
position(s) of the DoD.  
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5. The research assumes the reader has a fundamental understanding of 




This chapter provided the background, problem statement, and research 
questions associated with improving USSOCOM CCO execution of construction 
requirements in expeditionary environments.  Chapter II will provide the specific 























 The nature of the identified problem necessitated the use of multiple 
research methods.  Fundamentally, the problem was to develop instructional content 
addressing capability gaps found in USSOCOM contingency contracting.  This 
instructional content was addressed by developing the CM2 prototype.  In developing 
the CM2, the researcher followed Strickland’s (2006) framework for designing self-
directed instructional content.  This qualitative research framework is referred to as 
the ADDIE model—analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate, and includes 
a rapid prototyping approach.   
Qualitative research is often used to focus on real-world complexities, 
allowing the researcher to examine multiple perspectives of a problem or group of 
problems.  It helps define what needs to be studied in order for a researcher to best 
describe what is happening in a given environment.  This type of research is also 
focused on interpreting problems in a given environment and then evaluating the 
effectiveness of solutions to those problems (Hudgens, 2009).  In order to obtain 
multiple perspectives of the perceived problem(s) associated with this research, the 
researcher conducted multiple methods of data gathering and analysis.   
The researcher collected and analyzed archival data such as government 
reports, policies, training materials, and after-action reports (AARs) from 
USSOCOM.  He also collected data from questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews with key informants made up of USSOCOM personnel and supporting 
SMEs.  He developed the questionnaires (see Appendices 1-3) and conducted the 
interviews using procedures approved by the NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
for the study of human subjects. The information gathered from these informants 
suggests positive lessons learned, as well as challenges CCOs face within the 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 10 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
additional CCO training in dealing with construction requirements. According to 
Ausink, Baldwin, and Paul, “successful training programs tend to be multifunctional, 
involving personnel with diverse backgrounds that are relevant to new practices” 
(2004, p. 20); as such, targeted informants included USSOCOM staff members, 
customers, and CCOs of various rank and service backgrounds.  The researcher 
then triangulated this resulting data from archival sources and informants to 
compare commonalities between the literature and feedback from informants.  He 
then further utilized these commonalities to develop relevant learning objectives and 
content best suited for the CM2.       
The structure of the CM2 follows various self-directed learning concepts as 
outlined by Keirns (1999) and Keller (1984).  These concepts include the principles 
of self-instruction, ARCS model, and Blooms taxonomy.  These concepts will be 
discussed in further details in the section on self-directed learning below.     
B. Data Management  
Data collection is a selective process to be controlled primarily by the 
researcher’s formulation of the problem (Brewer & Hunter, 1989).  In this research, 
the problem involved determining capability gaps in USSOCOM contingency 
contracting and then developing instructional content to mitigate those gaps.  The 
data selected by the researcher for analysis included reports from the following: 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) (10), Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
(6), RAND (3), Office Management & Budget (OMB) (2), Inspector General (IG) (2), 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2), and AARs (12).  Other literature sources 
included: MBA theses (14), USSOCOM performance management reviews (PMR) 
(2), the Gansler report (USA, 2007), various DoD Instructions, regulations, and 
policy, along with related journal articles and training documents.  This data was 
reviewed for evidence of lessons learned and positive or negative commonalities.   
The diverse selection of sources, while not covering all existing data on the problem 
area, did allow the researcher to draw a reasonably certain conclusion based on 
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In addition to reviewing these reports, the researcher fielded questionnaires 
and conducted semi-structured interviews with USSOCOM CCOs, staff officers, and 
end-users.  The questionnaires and interview questions were developed based on 
an extensive review of various university websites and published survey design 
guidance (Dillman & Salant, 1994; Spector, 1994, Couper, 2001; Kennett, 2006; 
Fowler, 2008; Dillman, Smyth & Christian, 2008; Cano, 2009).  The questions were 
also developed through personal consultation with survey expert Professor Ronald 
Fricker of the Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School.  The 
questions were designed to illicit open-ended and creative responses to several 
questions regarding contingency contracting.  The questions were specifically 
related to training, integration, and effectiveness of contingency contracting. They 
were similar for all informants; however, questions were adapted for the different 
roles of the actual informant (CCO, staff, customer).  The target informants for these 
questionnaires and interviews were selected based on relevant experience and 
diversity of background (rank, functional area, position, etc.).  A strategy for selecting 
a sample for field research should be based on accessibility and relevance to the 
research question.  This approach can be used to generalize, with reasonable 
confidence, that the sample is a fair representation of the data (Brewer & Hunter, 
1989).  This particular strategy uses a constant comparative method in which the 
informants are provided questions to address the environment, as well as 
information regarding where the outcome of the study could lead the development of 
the CM2.  In this research, the informants were asked to share their experience in 
the relevant areas and provide direct recommendations for solutions to any 
perceived problems.  The informants were also asked direct questions regarding 
applicable content areas of training aides such as the CM2.  The researcher then 
compared these results to determine what commonalities exist among the 
responses.  These commonalities, in turn, help to confirm the validity of the 
questions and expected outcome from the study.      
Due to geographical and communication constraints, the sample of 
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informants did include personnel with various functional backgrounds and 
deployment experience.  Demographic information was obtained through the 
questionnaires and interviews.  Demographic questions included military service, 
rank, years of service, current position, location of and number of times deployed, 
and contracting certification level (if applicable).  In order to preserve anonymity of 
informants, the researcher will cite quotes from these questionnaires and interviews 
by position (division chief, chief of contracting, etc.) or role (CCO, staff, end-user).  A 
support letter from the USSOCOM DoP (see Appendix 4) was presented to each 
informant to help remove fear of retribution and express the intention of the 
research.      
Questionnaire informants consisted of the following USSOCOM personnel: 
four CCOs, three staff members, and two senior customers.  Interview informants 
consisted of the following USSOCOM personnel: five senior staff members and six 
CCOs.  Both questionnaire and interview attempts resulted in a 100% response rate.  
All CCO informants were currently deployed in support of USSOCOM during the 
time of the questionnaire or interview.  A more rigorous research approach would 
have been to select a larger sample size making up past and present USSOCOM 
personnel.  In an attempt to mitigate this primary-source limitation, the researcher 
analyzed all 16 USSOCOM AARs on file.  Deployments preceding these AARs were 
conducted in the last four years and were written by CCOs from all four military 
services, serving in 12 different locations, across 11 countries. 
C. Investigation and Analysis 
The researcher began this project with an understanding of the perceived 
need by USSOCOM leadership of a management module to instruct USSOCOM 
CCOs how to better execute construction requirements.  Thus, the research was 
conducted with the intent of garnering data to assist in the design of such a module, 
known herein as the CM2.  The field of instructional design provided the catalyst for 
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Design is the systematic method of research, planning, developing, 
evaluating and managing an instructional process. All of these individual 
components are incorporated into the method termed instructional design 
(Strickland, 2006). All models of instructional design have three common functions: 
(1) identifying the outcomes of the instruction, (2) developing the instruction, and (3) 
evaluating the effectiveness of the instruction (Strickland, 2006). 
The design process must be both systematic and specific. Systematic means 
an orderly, logical method of identifying, developing and evaluating a set of 
strategies aimed at attaining a particular instructional goal. Specific means each 
element of the plan must be applied with attention to precise details. By applying 
systematic procedures and being attentive to specific details, one can design 
effective instruction.  One such systematic procedure is known as the ADDIE model 
(Strickland, 2006).     
1. ADDIE Model 
The ADDIE model is a generic and simplified instructional systems design 
(ISD) model. ADDIE is an acronym for Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and 
Evaluate (Strickland, 2006).  This model follows traditional instructional systems 
design concepts for training developing while allowing a rapid prototyping approach 
to fielding the learning tool, in this case, the CM2.   
a. Analyze 
In the analyze phase, the researcher applying the ADDIE model reviews the 
related literature to determine knowledge, skills, and gaps, to clarify instructional 
problem(s), to establish basic goals and objectives, and to identify the learning 
environment and learner characteristics (Strickland, 2006)  According to Merriam-
Webster, 2009, analyze means to study or determine the nature and relationship of 
the parts of by analysis. Analyzing suggests separating or distinguishing component 
parts of a substance, process or situation, so as to discover its true nature or inner 
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this study, the researcher conducted literature review and key informant feedback 
analysis, as documented in Chapter V.   
b. Design   
In the design phase, the strategies for specific learning objectives are 
designed, mode of delivery is chosen, and conceptual method of evaluation is 
determined (Strickland, 2006).  The researcher designed the framework and learning 
objectives for the CM2 prototype during this phase. He coordinated the strategy with 
USSOCOM leadership to ensure applicability and synergy with existing policy and 
procedures.  It was during this phase that the decision was made to include both 
strategic and tactical level recommendations to the reader.  It was also during this 
phase that it became clear that the final evaluation of the prototype CM2 would have 
to be accomplished by USSOCOM after delivery.            
c. Develop   
In the develop phase, materials are produced according to the decisions 
made during the design phase (Strickland, 2006).  In this research, the specific 
content was developed for the CM2 as part of this phase.  The titling of chapters was 
also developed during this phase.  The content and chapter development of the CM2 
was accomplished to provide the relevant information in a reader-friendly manner.         
d. Implement   
In the implement phase, the researcher initiates production and tests 
prototypes (with targeted audience).  This is the phase in which an implementation 
plan is typically developed.  An implementation plan establishes the implementation 
timeline and procedures for both training the facilitators and the learner, as well as 
delivering the final product. The final product is developed based on needs and 
errors discovered while utilizing a prototype product with members of the target 
audience (Strickland, 2006).  In this phase, the researcher delivered the prototype 
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However, creating and executing the implementation plan and the final evaluation is 
the responsibility of USSOCOM.       
e. Evaluate   
Evaluation is an ongoing activity conducted at each phase of the ADDIE 
model. Evaluation consists of two parts: formative and summative. Formative 
evaluation is part of each proceeding phase and determines effectiveness and 
quality of each stage. Summative evaluation consists of tests for criterion-related 
referenced items, provides opportunity for feedback from the users and assesses 
learner outcomes (Strickland, 2006).  Formative evaluation was conducted as part of 
due diligence by the researcher.  The researcher kept in constant communication 
with USSOCOM leadership and experienced CCOs throughout the research 
process.  He also ensured that internal validity was evaluated by NPS peer review 
and USSOCOM member review.  Both validity measures resulted in positive 
feedback in terms of analysis, structure, and content.  The final stages of summative 
evaluation will be accomplished by USSOCOM personnel after this research has 
concluded.  
2. Self-directed Learning 
Another concept of instructional design utilized as part of this research is the 
concept of self-directed learning.  The term self-directed learning may be understood 
in a variety of ways.  As a methodology for instruction, self-directed learning refers to 
a learning situation in which an individual works with instructional materials without 
direct supervision or guidance.  “In situations in which many individuals must learn 
the same information but are unable to meet as a group, self-instructed materials 
may provide a very practical answer to the need” (Keirns, 1999, p. 8).  A 
circumstance in which learners have a varied level of entry knowledge or skill but 
must all attain a given outcome competency is another illustration of where self-
instructed materials are appropriate. Theoretical investigations of self-directed 
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employ to guide their cognitive experiences in learning situations (1999).  The 
principles discussed by Keirns in Designs for Self Instruction, Principles, Processes, 
and Issues in Developing Self-Directed Learning were instrumental in the 
development of the CM2.  Table 1 below summarizes the principles of self-instruction 
as outlined in her book.  
Table 1. Principles of Self-Instruction 
(adapted from Keirns, 1999) 
PRINCIPLES OF SELF-INSTRUCTION 
Active responding Ask questions within the text applying the concepts 




Put answers within text or include an accessible link 
for the reader. 
Small steps Maintain a step approach, keeping information 
organized in manageable sections so as not to 
overwhelm the reader. 
Self-pacing Do not include time limits, a method common for 
manual training. 
Testing by the 
learner 
Put quiz questions at the end of sections, with 
answers accessible to the reader. 
 
In developing the content and end-of-chapter questions for the CM2, the 
researcher took care to focus on motivating the reader toward the material.  The 
John Keller ARCS motivation model was used for this function.  The elements of the 
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Table 2. ARCS Motivation Model 
(adapted from Keirns, 1999; Keller, 1984) 
ARCS MOTIVATION MODEL 
Attention Grab attention from the reader with scenarios or 
other attention-getting strategies. 
Relevance Explain why a topic is important to the reader; 
reference policy or guidance from higher authority 
than the reader. 
Confidence Include quiz questions in each section; return to key 
concepts throughout the training. 
Satisfaction Consider whether the reader will be happy with the 
end product. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher needed a way to classify the different types of 
learning to be achieved in each learning objective within the CM2.  This classification 
was accomplished by determining the domains of learning associated with each 
learning objective.  “Most self-instruction occurs in the cognitive (knowing, thinking, 
acquiring, storing, and using information) domain” (Keirns, 1999, p. 12).  One of the 
best known models for classifying different types of learning in the cognitive domain 
is Bloom’s Taxonomy of Cognitive Objectives (Keirns, 1999, p. 12).  Table 3 depicts 
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Table 3. Bloom’s Taxonomy 
(Keirns, 1999, p.12) 
BLOOM’S TAXONOMY OF COGNITIVE OBJECTIVES 
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION 
Knowledge Ability to recall previously learned 
material 
Comprehension Ability to grasp meaning, explain, restate 
ideas 
Application Ability to use learned material in new 
situations 
Analysis Ability to separate material into 
component parts and show relationship 
between parts 
Synthesis Ability to put together separate ideas, 
establish new relationships 
Evaluation Ability to judge the worth of material 
against stated criteria 
 
The researcher took these cognitive objectives into account when analyzing 
the gaps found in the contingency contracting environment.  Once he determined the 
gaps, the evidence and extent of those gaps were used to suggest a certain level of 
cognitive understanding based on the Bloom’s categories described above.  The 
researcher then used these categories to develop the learning objectives within the 
CM2.  Based on the analysis of this research, Chapter V defines these learning 
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D. Validity and Reliability 
“Multi-method research validity is tested by triangulating multiple sets of data 
speaking to the same research question from different viewpoints” (Brewer & Hunter, 
1989, p. 83).  The researcher infers validity from the agreement between data sets. 
To support these inferences, the data must be collected by different means, 
employed independently of one another, but focused on the same research 
question(s) (1989).  In this research, data was collected from various literature and 
informants using a variety of methods, as discussed above.  All of the methods used 
focused on answering the same fundamental questions: what capability gaps exists 
within USSOCOM contingency contracting and can a management module be 
developed to mitigate those gaps.  This multi-method approach avoided reliance on 
any preconceived bias by the researcher and allowed for objective triangulation of 
the data.   
The prototype CM2 was tested for internal validity and reliability through peer 
debriefing and member checks (Hudgens, 2009). The peer debriefing consisted of 
graduate-level, previously warranted CCOs reviewing the module for credibility.  
Their review was based on the CCO’s experience and training associated with 
construction requirements. These debriefings resulted in agreement from the peer 
members that the content and structure of the CM2 would provide useful and 
effective training support for CCOs regardless of their military service, background, 
experience, or education.  Furthermore, the researcher conducted USSOCOM 
member checks by distributing a draft version of the prototype through the 
USSOCOM staff headquarters to CCOs currently deployed in a contingency 
environment under USSOCOM warrant authority and supporting construction 
requirements.  Feedback from the members suggested the prototype provides a 
comprehensive and effective tool.  However, the researcher recommends further 
testing for validity and reliability using the aforementioned ADDIE method be 
conducted.  In Chapter VI, the researcher provides additional information regarding 
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E. Summary 
This chapter explained how the researcher conducted exploratory research 
using a variety of qualitative research methodologies.  This research is focused on 
real-world complexities, allowing the researcher to examine multiple perspectives of 
a problem or group of problems with USSOCOM CCO’s executing construction 
requirements in a contingency contracting environment.  The researcher collected 
data from questionnaires and from semi-structured interviews with key informants 
made up of USSOCOM personnel and supporting SMEs using standard operating 
procedures approved by the NPS Institutional Review Board for the study of human 
subjects. The information gathered from these informants suggests positive lessons 
learned, as well as challenges CCOs face within the contingency contracting 
environment. Targeted informants included USSOCOM staff members, customers, 
and CCOs of various rank and military service backgrounds. Archival data such as 
government reports, policies, training materials, and AARs were also collected and 
analyzed.   
The investigation and analysis herein follows a multi-method approach to 
qualitative research. The development of the CM2 follows the Analyze, Design, 
Develop, Implement, and Evaluate (ADDIE) model, with a rapid prototyping 
approach (Strickland, 2006).  The internal structure of the CM2 follows various 
learning concepts as outlined by Keirns (1999) and Keller (1984).  Prior to 
implementation, the validity and reliability of the prototype CM2 was tested using 
peer debriefings and member checks. Chapter III will explain the background and 
current environment of contingency contracting. Chapter VI will address additional 
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III. Contingency Contracting 
A. Overview 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature surrounding the contingency 
contracting phenomenon.  To give the reader the context in which identified 
problems exist, this chapter will breakdown the term contingency and define the 
concepts of contingency contracting.  Chapter IV will then discuss the framework of 
USSOCOM and how CCOs operate within its structure. In Chapter V, the researcher 
will further analyze policy and guidance from the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and its supplements, USSOCOM Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), 
Inspector General (IG) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) Reports, 
related Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC I/A) policy directives, and 
feedback from USSOCOM personnel through questionnaires and AARs to identify 
key concerns and possible solutions to identified problems as they concern 
USSOCOM. 
B. Historical Context 
In the late Eighteenth Century, the United States military was established via 
the American Revolutionary militia. The American Revolutionaries focused their 
organic capabilities solely on the war strategies and battles at hand. Consequently, 
the leaders heavily depended on external logistical support to provide basic life 
support to the troops, such as food, clothing, and shelter (D’Angelo, Houglan, & 
Ruckwardt, 2007).  The US government, even during its infancy, recognized the 
importance of outsourcing external support for the military (Luse, Madeline, Smith & 
Starr, 2005).  
Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance in 1781, stated, “in all countries 
engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that contracts with 
private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the subsistence, 
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was not formally recognized as contingency contracting at the time; however, the 
principles and objectives of the modern version of the process are identical to those 
Morris described. This direct purchase system, not unlike today’s contingency 
contracting, had its share of problems. George Washington and Alexander Hamilton 
observed that contractors were often more concerned with increasing their profits 
than with providing the supplies and services the Army required (Shrader, 1990). 
Another significant problem during this period was contractors failing to meet 
delivery requirements. A notable delinquent contract was Eli Whitney’s failure to 
meet a delivery schedule of 4,000 muskets to the War Department; the requirement 
was fulfilled eleven years after the established date (Nagle, 1992). Despite recurring 
problems, the military has continued to use private industry to augment its logistical 
force (D’Angelo et al., 2007). 
While the term contingency contracting was coined only a decade or two ago, 
the United States military has been contracting out logistical support for its military 
forces—in different degrees, in both domestic and overseas operations, with varying 
levels of success—since 1775. Early attempts at contracting logistics support for 
military operations sometimes brought the expedition to ruins, but since World War 
II, contingency contracting has generally proved an integral part of the military’s 
operational capabilities, although problems still exist today (Luse et al., 2005). 
Reduced manpower and increased global positioning of military forces has 
increased demand for contractor support during contingencies.  For decades, the 
military has been contracting for goods and services—becoming a less self-sufficient 
organization.  This means contractors are more often relied upon for supplies, 
services, and construction in contingency environments (Hill, 2006).  Metrics indicate 
there are more contractors on the battlefield than ever before; as of 2007, State and 
Defense department figures show 180,000 civilians working in Iraq under US 
contracts (Miller, 2007, June 4).  The US must conduct contracting in contingency 
operations in order to provide essential support to time-sensitive operational 
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of supplies and services in a contingency environment—ranging from simplified 
acquisition procedures to complex defense system acquisitions, interagency 
support, services, and military construction.  
C. Contingency Defined 
A contingency is an event that requires the deployment of military forces in 
response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and 
order, political instability, or other military operations (Yoder, 2007).  A contingency 
operation may either be declared or non-declared. According to 10 United States 
Code (USC), a declared contingency in the DoD may be either: 
a. Designated by the Secretary of Defense when members of the Armed 
Forces may become involved in military actions against an enemy of 
the US and/or;  
b. Declared by the President or Congress when members of the 
uniformed forces are called on active duty (a reserve component 
mobilization) under any provision of law during a declared war/national 
emergency (USC, 2008, 101(a) (13)). 
In contrast, a non-declared contingency operation is any other DoD operation 
other than those described above. Barbaris and Callanan explain that “The 
distinction between a declared contingency and a non-declared contingency is 
crucial in the contracting community” (2008, p. 9).  In a declared contingency, often 
the regulations and policies outlined within the FAR (along with those of the various 
military services) are relaxed to provide flexible and streamlined guidance to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of expeditionary or wartime functions.  FAR 
Part 18, entitled “Emergency Acquisitions,” details many of the streamlined 
processes (GSA, 2009).   
D. Types of Contingency Operations 
Since the inception of our nation, members of the US Armed Forces have 
deployed throughout the globe in response to emergency situations caused by 
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called upon for rescue and humanitarian relief efforts, and to protect US national 
security interests against demonstrations of force and raids worldwide.  The volatile, 
urgent, and uncertain nature of these efforts creates the distinct need for advanced 
planning, rapid response, adaptable solutions, and flexible procedures during 
support of a contingency operation. The operational environment will influence the 
extent to which contracting forces are utilized.  Contingency contracting support has 
evolved over time from support of military operations into more complex support of 
interagency needs (DPAP, 2009). 
Four main types of DoD-supported contingency operations include major 
theater war, smaller-scale contingencies, military operations other than war 
(MOOTW), and domestic disaster/emergency relief operations (Barbaris & Callanan, 
2008). 
1. Major Theater War (MTW) 
In a MTW, hostilities are ongoing, imminent or likely, and involve a substantial 
commitment of US military forces (DAU, 2005, pp. 2-7).  These types of operations 
are generally conflicts that engage an entire force structure within a specific 
geographical area. Contracting support is provided to supplement a vigorous combat 
support and combat service support infrastructure. Operations IRAQI FREEDOM 
(OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) are current examples of MTWs. 
2. Small-scale Contingencies (SSCs) 
The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) established small-scale 
contingencies (SSCs) as a new mission for military operational requirements and a 
major consideration in deciding upon the appropriate force structure.  Support 
provided for SSCs is similar in nature to that provided for a MTW, yet is less lengthy 
and can be as minor as a show of force.  However, one key difference is that SSC 
operations are set in motion against a less compelling threat than those involved in 
MTW operations.  They also dedicate fewer US forces and have a more restricted 
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(Grenada) and JUST CAUSE (Panama)—along with the Implementation 
Force/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia later associated with Operations 
ALLIED FORCE (Kosovo)—are all examples of SSCs.  
3. Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) 
MOOTWs refer to a wide range of activities utilized by US military forces to 
support operations other than large-scale war.  The main focus of these operations 
is to prevent war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities in 
response to domestic crises.  They may involve both combat and noncombat 
operations. MOOTW are generally conducted outside the Continental United States 
(OCONUS); however, some types may be conducted within the Continental United 
States (CONUS) in support of civil authorities consistent with established law.  
Operations PROVIDE COMFORT (Northern Iraq) and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 
(Haiti) are two examples of MOOTWs conducted by the US over the past several 
years (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008). 
4. Domestic Disaster/Emergency Relief (DD/ER) 
The spectrum of assistance provided during DD/ER operations includes 
CONUS natural and man-made disasters, CONUS local community disturbances, 
and CONUS terrorist activity. However, the main focus of this type of support is to 
mitigate the effects of natural or man-made disasters, such as hurricanes, 
earthquakes, floods, oil spills, riots, and air, rail, or highway accidents (Barbaris & 
Callanan, 2008). DoD disaster relief efforts included clean-up and humanitarian 
assistance efforts resulting from hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Katrina. 
E. Contingency Contracting 
The Defense Acquisition University’s (DAU) Contingency Contracting course 
(CON234) defines Contingency Contracting as: “Direct contracting support to tactical 
and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and MOOTW, 
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contracting is the process by which essential supplies and services are obtained to 
support deployed forces.  This can be during a declared war or peacetime and can 
take place either in the CONUS or OCONUS.  The definition of contingency 
contracting is deliberately broad in order to include the four types of contingency 
operations discussed above (DAU, 2005, pp. 2-7). 
Additionally, when planning for contingency operations, CCOs consider the 
maturity level of the environment to help determine the type and level of required 
contracting support. Existing resources available in a respective AOR are also 
considered.  For example, a CCO would prepare for a contingency operation in the 
CONUS differently than OCONUS, and areas such as Western or Eastern Europe 
differently than in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Iran.  A contingency environment can be 
classified as either mature or immature, as described below.   
A mature environment is one that can be characterized by a sophisticated 
infrastructure capable of supporting and sustaining operations for extensive periods 
of time. A mature environment can have all or a combination of the following 
characteristics: legal framework, host-nation agreements, financial networks to 
support complex transactions, vigorous transportation systems, business capacity, 
capability, and a willingness to interact (Yoder, 2007). A mature environment has the 
capability to quickly adapt to changing requirements and priorities.  It often consists 
of vendors and suppliers that have prior contracting experience with the US 
Government and that can comply with FAR requirements.   
In contrast, an immature contracting environment is one lacking the support 
infrastructure detailed above.  Few, if any, vendors may be available with which to 
conduct business, and they likely have had no previous experience working with the 
US Government (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008). 
While no two contingency contracting operations are exactly alike, they fall 
into one or more of the four typical phases of a contingency: Phase I - 
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Phase IV - Termination/Redeployment (AFLMA, 2008, p. 126).  It is important for 
CCOs to understand what phase of a contingency an operation falls within, as this 
classification can assist them in assessing their resources and preparing for the 
requirements needed to fulfill mission support.  It is important to note that not all 
operations will follow the particular sequence detailed below; a location may be in a 
hybrid phase based on various factors—including, but not limited to operational 
environment, mission adjustments and personnel surges. 
1. Phase I – Mobilization and Initial Deployment 
The mobilization and initial deployment phase of an operation, normally the 
first 30-45 days, can be one of the most stressful and confusing environments a 
CCO will face.  As initial support organizations may not be available upon arrival, a 
CCO may perform different roles in rapid sequence, such as: initial requestor, 
approving official, certifying officer, lodging officer, logistics coordinator, 
transportation officer, inspector, supply/inventory manager, and property 
administrator, among other things. The need to award contracts quickly upon arrival 
is usually imperative to the mission. The number one priority for contracting 
professionals during this stage is to be responsive to providing basic life-support 
requirements, security services, and support for arrival of the initial ground troops. 
These items can include food, water, shelter, utilities, transportation, fuel, sanitation, 
interpreters and guides. 
A CCO expected to deploy during this phase of a contingency can plan ahead 
and obtain access to sample documents that may be needed for forming and 
administering contract awards.  These documents include statements of work, logs 
of available contract numbers, contract forms, and award checklists. CCOs must 
remain flexible, as the number of available contracting personnel during this phase 
of a contingency is limited.  The predominant types of contract vehicles used during 
this phase of a contingency operation are SF44s with cash payments, government-
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addition, Standard Form 44s (SF 44) act as an all-in-one order: invoice and payment 
voucher with cash payments. 
2. Phase II - Buildup 
The buildup phase of a contingency operation, normally Day 45 and forward, 
is generally a continuation of the initial deployment phase.  The main body of troops 
to support the mission will arrive, along with additional contracting personnel; 
however, the number of new contracting personnel may not seem proportional to the 
number of troops needing support.  Again, the main focus is basic life-support and 
security requirements, but a CCO must also now pay attention to construction 
material, heavy equipment, quality-of-life items (audio/visual items, gym equipment, 
etc.), and office equipment.  The establishment of a contracting office with a solid 
and reliable vendor base is a key priority in this phase. The use of cash transactions 
is limited at this point, as the contracting office is working towards establishment of 
BPAs with a network of ordering officers (who may have decentralized control of the 
ordering or may coordinate with the CCO for each order off the BPA). 
3. Phase III - Sustainment 
The sustainment phase of a contingency operation runs from the end of the 
buildup stage through the point that redeployment begins. Contracting activities will 
continue to focus on life-support and quality-of-life requirements; however, an 
increased focus will be given to providing permanent facilities and equipment, office 
supplies, and discretionary services. The main priority of a CCO and his or her 
support team will be establishing long-term, indefinite delivery indefinite quantity 
(IDIQ) contracts and BPAs that consolidate requirements—thus benefiting from 
economies of scale and reducing costs. The improvement of contract files and 
documentation is crucial, as internal controls are established to minimize waste and 
abuse. The contracting team will also focus on increasing competition amongst its 
vendor base and on transitioning the workload for the next round of contracting 
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4. Phase IV - Termination and Redeployment 
This phase of a contingency operation will be characterized by an urgency to 
prepare the troops to go home or to deploy forward to other areas of an operation. 
The CCO will continue to focus on life-support contracts throughout the duration of 
the mission.  New requirements may include packing and freight services, 
transportation of troops, and preparation of material and equipment for transfer 
(Yoder, 2007).  Contracting personnel will be required to terminate and/or closeout 
existing contracts and orders.  This includes ensuring final payment to contractors 
and closing any open issues associated with their contracts.  If redeployment is 
scheduled, a CCO’s team prepares the contract files and documentation for 
reassignment and coordinates with the appropriate agency or office.  The CCO may 
transfer the files to an organization such as the Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA), or the CCO may be responsible for storing or destroying the files 
themselves as appropriate.   
During all of these phases, CCOs are responsible for maintaining accurate 
and complete contract files in a complex and high-threat environment, while 
constantly adapting to new procedures, new technology, and new demands.  These 
requirements get even more complicated, and the threat environment often 
increases when CCOs are deployed supporting USSOCOM SOF teams on the front 
lines.   
F. Summary 
Since 2001, DoD’s contingency contracting environment has changed 
dramatically, mainly as a result of our reconstruction efforts in Iraq (and 
Afghanistan). Contingency contracting encompasses all contracting done in a 
contingency environment (declared and non-declared), including various phases of 
contingencies.  As mentioned above, the DoD has also experienced an 
unprecedented reliance on contractors to support the force. Contractors are now 
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support in contingencies, and help with the cradle-to-grave contracting process 
(DPAP, 2009).   
This chapter defined the terms contingency and contingency contracting as 
they relate to the DoD and the four main types of DoD-supported contingency 
operations including: major theater wars, smaller-scale contingencies, military 
operations other than war, and domestic disaster/emergency relief operations.  The 
researcher also explained mature versus immature contingency environments, 
followed by the four typical phases of a contingency: mobilization/initial deployment, 
buildup, sustainment, and/or termination/redeployment. In Chapter IV, the 
researcher will examine the USSOCOM organizational structure and explain how 
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IV. USSOCOM 
A. USSOCOM Framework 
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1986 (SOAL-KA, 2008) 
established the concept of USSOCOM. A year later, the 1987 Nunn-Cohen 
Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Hill, 2006) formally created USSOCOM 
and established the military service-component support roles. It also provided 
substantial autonomy for Special Operations Forces (SOF), to include unique budget 
and procurement authority for SOF units.  “The broad intent of these provisions was 
to create a more effective special operations capability that was not beholden to 
parochial service attitudes or constrained by service priorities for conventional 
forces” (Hill, 2006, p. 3).  However, since September 11, 2001, the focus of 
USSOCOM has shifted from that of a force provider to that of a Combatant 
Command.  The command has a dual role as a unified combatant command, while 
still having unique military service-like authorities in terms of procurement and 
developing personnel.  Key elements of these responsibilities are defined in Table 4 
Table 4. USSOCOM Dual Responsibilities  
(Cannaday, 2008) 
USSOCOM – A UNIQUE AND DYNAMIC ORGANIZATION  
(Roles and Authorties) 
UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND 
MILITARY DEPARTMENT 
(SERVICE-LIKE) 
Command all US-based SOF Organize, train, and equip SOF 
Sychronize planning for global operations 
against terrorist networks 
Develop SOF strategies, doctrine, and 
tactics 
Deploy SOF to support Geographical 
Combatant Commander objectives Program and budget for SOF 
Conduct operations globally 
Procure SOF-peculiar items 
(Procurement Authority) 
Plan and execute pre-crisis activties Monitor SOF personnel 
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Operations conducted by SOF teams encompass the use of small units in 
direct and indirect military actions designed for national security interest, strategic or 
organizational objectives. They require units with combinations of highly trained, 
specialized personnel and equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine 
capabilities of conventional military forces. The nature of SOF operations are often 
extremely politically sensitive missions, in which only the best equipped and most 
proficient forces are deployed to avoid detection and possible mission failure that 
could result in damage to the United States’ prestige and interests (Cluck, 2009).   
 
Figure 1. USSOCOM Services Command Headquarters (CONUS Footprint) 
(Cannaday, 2008) 
The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps commands of USSOCOM 
(illustrated in Figure 1 above) use authorities and budgets granted by legislation to 
the USSOCOM commander to organize, equip, train, and deploy their forces to 
support operational commanders around the globe. Olson (2009) explains, “When 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 33 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
respective geographic Combatant Commander[s]” (p. 54).  Administratively, the SOF 
forces still report to the respective theater special operations commands depicted in 
Figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 2. Special Operations Theatre Commands    
(Cannaday, 2008) 
Over 10,000 members of SOF are under OPCON of Central Command 
(CENTCOM). Over 2,000 others are scattered throughout the globe, in over 60 
countries—including over 100 SOF personnel assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) structure 
(Olson, 2009). Figure 3 below depicts the respective AORs for the US Combatant 
Commands throughout the world.  
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The USSOCOM commander has unique procurement authorities and 
responsibilities compared to that of other Combatant Commands (COCOMs).  
Similar to the authorities granted to each military Service, Title 10 USC, Section 167, 
vests in the USSOCOM commander the responsibility and authority to develop and 
acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the 
functions of the head of agency, and the authority to execute funds.  USSOCOM 
uses special appropriation funding known as Major Force Progam-11 (MFP-11) to 
support the development, acquisition, and sustainment activities for USSOCOM.  
This authority is delegated down to the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive (SOAE), 
Mr. James W. Cluck, as the Senior Procurement Executive for the command.  He 
leads the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Center (SOAL) in executing 
USSOCOM funding authority (Cluck, 2009).  Figure 4 depicts the matrix relationship 
of these organizations.    
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Although USSOCOM’s budget is historically less than 2% of the total defense 
budget (Olson, 2009), this procurement authority has resulted in a significant 
increase to expenditures within USSOCOM.  During the 1990s, USSOCOM 
expenditures averaged under $400 million. As of the end of fiscal year 2008 (FY08), 
that number has grown to over $2.68 billion (Cluck, 2009).  While breakdowns of 
historical contingency expenditures are often classified, we do know that OCOs 
account for roughly $200 million of the FY10 $1.6 billion budget request 
(McKaughan, 2009).          
B. USSOCOM Contingency Contracting 
The contracting arm of SOAL is the Director of Procurement (also known as 
SOAL-K), located within the USSOCOM Headquarters, MacDill AFB, Florida. The 
Mission Statement of the SOAL-K Office depicts its goals: “contracting professionals 
teaming with acquisition and industry professionals to rapidly transform acquisition 
strategies into superior technologies, equipment and services for USSOCOM and 
SOF” (Cluck, 2009, p. 43).  An overview of the various divisions within SOAL-K is 
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Figure 5. Operations Division and Contingency Contracting Cell within 
 the USSOCOM Contracting Organizational Structure 
(Cannaday, 2008) 
SOAL-K places CCOs within deployed SOF teams through the Operations 
Division, SOAL-KA, as depicted in Figure 5.  The SOAL-KA division handles the 
Contingency Contracting planning and policy. It also conducts the orientation and 
training for CCOs before they deploy into a specific AOR with SOF teams.  As part 
of USSOCOM, SOAL-KA is not a force provider, nor does it have OPCON over the 
individual CCO assigned to support the SOF units (LTC Smallwood, SOAL-KA 
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1. Contracting Versus Command Authority 
The SOAL-KA division exercises the given procurement authority over the 
CCOs by issuing them a CCO warrant IAW FAR 2.101, which gives each CCO the 
signature authority to obligate USSOCOM MFP-11 funds, enter into contracts, 
terminate them, and make determinations and findings.  A simplified depiction of 
where this authority begins and how it is delegated down to the CCO is provided in 
Figure 6. 
USSOCOM FLOW OF CONTRACTING AUTHORITY 





USSOCOM ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE 
(SENIOR PROCUREMENT EXECUTIVE) 
 
USSO77COM DIRECTOR OF PROCUREMENT 
(HEAD OF CONTRACTING ACTIVITY (HCA) 
 
USSOCOM CONTRACTING OFFICERS 
Figure 6. Flow of Contracting Authority to a USSOCOM CCO  
(Cannaday, 2008) 
Lines of authority can be easily blurred with USSOCOM CCOs. Figure 7 
depicts the typical Command Authority versus Contracting Authority in a standard 
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Figure 7. Flow of Contracting Authority to Conventional CCO  
(AFLMA, 2008, p. 37) 
Unlike USSOCOM’s streamlined structure, a typical contingency contracting 
unit falls deep within a complex operational structure of forces.  In larger or more 
complex contingency operations—such as Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and 
ENDURING FREEDOM—there is a specific command established, conceptually 
known as a joint theatre support contracting command (JTSCC).  This concept is 
defined in depth in Contingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century 
(AFLMA, 2008, p. 47).  The current JTSCC is better known as the Joint Contracting 
Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A).  This structure often requires more oversight 
than can typically be provided through a single lead-service organizational option, in 
which a contracting team falls deep within a single service chain of command 
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Operational conditions that may drive this option could include, but may not 
be limited to the following: 
 Extremely complex operation that requires direct control of theater 
support contracting by the JFC commander,  
 Mission that is of long-term duration, 
 Mission that is beyond the capability of a single military service,  
 Mission that requires significant coordination of contracting and civil-
military personnel on aspects of the JFC’s campaign plan, and/or  
 Significant numbers of different military service forces that may be 
operating in the same area or joint bases that may be served by the 
same local vendor base.  
A JTSCC, by design, is a joint command that has command-and-control 
authority over designated, service-component, theater-support, contracting 
organizations and personnel within a designated support area. This command 
performs the same functions as a lead service contracting organization, but reports 
directly to the JFC.  Since GCCs do not have their own contracting authority, the 
JTSCC’s HCA authority flows from one of the service components (normally the 
executive agency or lead service component).  
There is not a formally approved, set model for a JTSCC.  Conceptually, the 
JTSCC will be initiated only for major sustained operations, as the JCC-I/A is 
currently. As seen in recent operations, these sustained operations may include 
major reconstruction and transition to civil authority mission requirements in addition 
to the standard joint-forces-support mission requirements. In these major, long-term 
stability operations, JFC commanders often prefer to establish a JTSCC with 
separate senior contracting officials (SCOs) responsible to support the JFC, host 
nation forces or transition operations, and reconstruction support.  
The JTSCC structure is very robust and includes multiple layers of positions 
for leadership and personnel matrixed into subordinate units supporting the JTSCC 
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2. Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) Overview: 
a. Commander 
The commander of a JTSCC is normally an 0-7 or 0-8 with significant 
contingency contracting experience.  Because of the manner by which the military 
services develop their contingency contracting officers, this position will normally be 
filled by an Air Force or Army general officer. The JTSCC commander reports to the 
JFC commander and is responsible for ensuring the theater support contracting 
mission is conducted in an effective, efficient, and well-coordinated fashion. This 
commander would also serve as the JFC’s principal advisor for contracting support.  
b. Administrative Staff  
 The commander’s administrative staff support is determined by the JTSCC 
commander. This support requires no specific rank and no contracting-related 
experience. 
c. Chief of Staff 
Like all chiefs of staff, the JTSCC chief of staff is responsible for integrating all 
special and primary staff functions within the command. Normally, this position 
would be an O-6 with contingency contracting experience. 
d. J1  
The JTSCC J1 performs personnel actions, to include working personnel 
assignments, joint manning document (JMD)-related actions (e.g., number of 
personnel slots), awards, and ratings. The J1 generally would be a personnel officer 
with no specific rank or contracting-related experience.  
e. J2/3/5 
A JTSCC does not typically have or need a J2, J3 or J5 office. If required by 
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experience—is responsible to assist the commander and SCOs with synchronizing 
support to ongoing operations and planned future operations. The J2/3/5 focus is on 
supporting the JFC commander’s intent with effective and efficient contracting 
actions. If needed, the J2/3/5 could also contain separate policy and contract-
compliance divisions.  
f. J4 
The JTSCC J4 performs logistics actions, to include general office supply, 
coordinating facility support, intra-theater travel, and other similar actions. The J4 is 
normally a logistics officer with no specific rank or contracting-related experience. 
g. J6 
The JTSCC J6 performs communications-support-related actions, to include 
coordinating communications support, website management, and related functions. 
The J6 normally would be a communications or signal officer with no specific rank or 
contracting-related experience. 
h. Senior Contracting Official (SCO) 
The JTSCC generally has one to three SCOs, normally at the O-6 level, with 
significant contracting-related experience and certifications. The SCO’s general 
responsibilities include: 
 Overseeing day-to-day contracting operations within his/her area of 
contracting responsibility,  
 Overseeing and assessing the effectiveness of contracting programs,  
 Issuing warrants and determining delegated warrant authorities, 
 Participating in the JARB (primarily the SCO for forces support),  
 Chairing the JCSB as directed,  
 Managing and executing unit inspections through procurement and 
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 Developing and providing oversight and management-control 
programs,  
 Conducting special reviews as required,  
 Managing the contract audit follow-up program, and  
 Suspension and debarment.  
i. Senior Contracting Official Operations Staff 
Each SCO will normally have an operations staff with primary duties that 
mirror the joint theater support contracting command J-staff functions listed 
previously. These staffs can vary in size and should be made up of officers and 
noncommissioned officers (NCO) with at least some contracting and acquisition 
experience. 
j. Senior Contracting Official for Forces Support 
The SCO for forces support is responsible for planning, coordinating, and 
managing theater support contracting for deployed US forces and multinational 
forces. This support may also include support to interagency personnel and facilities, 
but does not normally include support to other government-agency-led civil 
reconstruction projects. The SCO for forces support will generally have three or 
more RCCs.  Each RCC will have with multiple Regional Contracting Offices 
(RCOs). Also, the SCO for forces support may have a specialty contracting division 
to handle common, joint operational area (JOA), or complex contracts that exceed 
RCC and RCO capabilities. Three contracting organizations that often report to the 
SCO for forces support and are established within a JTSCC include: RCCs, RCOs, 
and specialty contracts divisions.  
k. Regional Contracting Centers (RCC) 
The specific makeup of these RCCs is dependent on the specific mission 
support requirement; however, a typical RCC could consist of 10 to 25 warranted 
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these RCCs to a major land force (division, corps, or Marine Expeditionary Force) 
headquarters or air expeditionary wing or group. The key to the proper manning of 
these RCCs and their subordinate RCOs is not the rank of the contracting officers on 
staff, but warrant and experience levels of the staff members. 
l. Regional Contracting Offices (RCO) 
RCOs are joint-staffed contracting organizations under the command and 
control of an RCC. RCOs are made up of two to eight warranted contracting officers, 
NCOs, and DoD civilians. The size and makeup of an RCO is based on actual 
mission-support requirements. RCOs normally provide area support to specific 
forward operating bases (FOBs) and designated areas within the JOA. 
m. Specialty Contracts Division 
In some operations, there may be a need to develop a specialty contracts 
division that can contract for common, JOA-wide services or supplies. Additionally, 
these contracting organizations may be utilized to perform complex contracting 
actions that exceed the RCC and RCO capabilities. The specialty contracts division 
will be made up of specially selected, highly trained contracting officers, NCOs, and 
DoD civilians who have the requisite experience and warrants to handle large, 
complex contract actions. 
n. Senior Contracting Official for Host Nation (HN) Forces and 
Transition Support 
This SCO for HN and transition support is responsible for planning, 
coordinating, and managing theater support contracting actions in support of the 
JFC mission to develop, organize, train, equip, and sustain HN security forces. The 
SCO for HN and transition support is also responsible for providing training and 
transition assistance to HN security forces (and other governmental agencies as 
directed) in order to facilitate the development and sustainment of their own 
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o. Service and Commodity Divisions 
The SCO for HN Forces and transition support would normally have some 
type of subordinate contracting organization (or organizations) responsible for 
managing HN security forces and theater support contracting actions that cannot be 
readily accommodated by the existing forces. 
p. Transition Teams.  
If established, the SCO for HN and transition support will normally have 
multiple transition teams. These transition teams are responsible for planning and 
executing support of HN security forces and, if directed, HN governmental 
contracting support organizations and capabilities. These teams will vary in size, but 
must be manned with military or DoD civilian personnel with the contracting 
experience required by their assigned mission. 
q. Senior Contracting Official for Reconstruction Support.  
The SCO for reconstruction is responsible for planning, coordinating, and 
managing theater support contracting actions in support of the civil reconstruction 
mission. Normally, the SCO for reconstruction would directly support the US Chief of 
Mission or US Agency for International Development (USAID). The SCO for 
reconstruction generally would have multiple-sector support-contracting 
organizations. These subordinate organizations could include, but are not limited to, 
the following reconstruction sector areas: water, sanitation, electricity, transportation, 
oil production, and other related functions. As much as resources permit, these 
staffs will be made up of select, highly trained contracting officers, NCOs, and DoD 
civilians who have the requisite experience and warrant to handle large, complex 
reconstruction-related contract actions (AFLMA, 2008). 
Figure 8 depicts the textbook structure of a JTSCC as outlined in the most 
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Figure 8. Typical Joint Theater Support Contracting Command Organization  
(AFLMA, 2008, p. 47) 
A typical USSOCOM contracting operation will be most similar to a Regional 
Contracting Office at best.  Often, USSOCOM contracting units are made up of one 
to three CCOs operating in support of the theatre SOF teams in a particular AOR.  
They do not often fall within the robust structure outlined above; therefore, although 
streamlined, they do not have the vast network of personnel and resources available 
as a JTSCC would.  Although as noted above, the command authority and OPCON 
comes from the local AOR GCC, while the procurement (contracting) authority 
comes direct from HQ USSOCOM.  This differentiation can increase a CCO’s ability 
to act in a more timely fashion; however, this also causes difficulty in coordinating 
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C. Summary 
This chapter explained the organizational construct of USSOCOM.  It also 
provided the framework of USSOCOM, showing its unique procurement authority 
and how that authority is delegated down to the CCO through the SOAL.  
Information in this chapter provided a basic understanding of USSOCOM.  This 
chapter also delineated the differences between a typical JTSCC (such as the JCC 
I/A) and the construct of operations faced by USSOCOM CCOs.  Chapter IV 
identifies specific commonalities with construction requirements experienced by 
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V. Analysis 
Chapter V provides a literature review, including findings from governmental 
reports and audits, scholarly reports, after-actions reports, and the results of 
interviews and fielded questionnaires with USSOCOM personnel. As a way to 
properly categorize the vast spectrum of information obtained during the data 
collection, the analysis is organized into three overarching pillars: people, processes, 
and platforms.    
A. (People) Training of Personnel 
As a fundamental pillar for success, the makeup and training of personnel is 
crucial in virtually any environment.  This section will analyze the existing makeup of 
the acquisition workforce and describe the future direction in which experts believe 
that workforce is headed.  The chapter will then describe the training opportunities, 
requirements, and shortfalls of acquisition personnel and how varying levels of 
effectiveness and standards exist for USSOCOM CCOs.  The chapter will also 
describe how contingency contracting lessons learned are documented and how 
contracting leadership and CCOs can use this documentation to enhance their 
training programs. 
1. Changing Workforce 
In an April 2, 2008, breakout session at the National Contract Management 
Association’s (NCMA) World Congress, Dr. Steven Kelman, Weatherhead Professor 
of Public Management, Harvard University, commented on the present state of 
government contracting, saying that the acquisition workforce is at risk of falling into 
a “death spiral” (as cited in Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).  Kelman describes this as a 
combination of insufficient numbers of contingency contracting professionals and 
increasingly complex work requirements.  This type of working environment raises 
error rates, and as a result, increases audits and management oversight (Barbaris & 
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The contingency contracting environment is plagued by many of the same 
problems as the conventional acquisition workforce.  In 2007, the Secretary of the 
Army established an Independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations. The commission was chaired by Dr. 
Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics (AT&L)), and was tasked to review the Army’s policies, procedures, 
and operations in contingency environments, and to recommend necessary changes 
to ensure that future military operations achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness, 
and transparency (USA, 2007).  This report, commonly known as the Gansler 
Report, is widely respected as a comprehensive assessment of expeditionary 
contracting activities. The findings within this report documented systemic problems 
with expeditionary contracting that include, but are not limited to, the USSOCOM 
AOR.  While USSOCOM is made up of all military services, the Army is the DoD 
Executive Agent for all contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (USA, 2007). 
Therefore, it plays a critical role in training and shaping the personnel who support 
the effectiveness of USSOCOM CCO operations.  This background is important 
when analyzing the results of the Gansler Report because as the lead SOF agent, 
the situation in the Army is directly linked to the outcomes in at least the two largest 
existing AORs for contingency contracting (Iraq and Afgahnistan).  These are two 
areas in which USSOCOM is “significantly involved,” according the SOAL-K Director 
Procurement.  Currently, the Army is unable to fill the necessary contracting billets in 
terms of either quantity of qualifications.  Although providing contracting support to 
the Army and Marine Corps is not part of Air Force doctrine, the Air Force provides 
over 67% of the contracting resources for JCC-I/A—including most of the complex 
actions such as reconstruction operations (USA, 2007).  This percentage was 
estimated by the SOAL-KA division chief to be the same for USSOCOM billets 
throughout the world.  This means that while the Army is leading the joint force in 
policy and procedure for contingency contracting, the Air Force is leading in manning 
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The USSOCM contingency contracting workforce is matrixed through tasking 
of personnel across all military services under an applicable CENTCOM UMD. In 
other words, members of the workforce do not come directly from special operations 
units; rather, they originate from the acquisition workforce of their respective military 
service.  Based on relevant publications, congressional hearings and Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports, the Army contracting community has a least 
four key problem areas that must be addressed, as they affect the Army’s ability to 
effectively and efficiently respond in contingency contracting situations.  Those four 
areas are: the changing war environment, increased contracting workload and 
complexity of contract actions, increased responsibility of acquisition professionals, 
and a declining capability of the acquisition workforce (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008, p. 
17).   
The changing war environment impacts how personnel train because it 
involves the move from a post-Cold War era to one in which asymmetric, non-state 
sponsored warfare is more prominent. This type of warfare is also known as fourth 
generation war (Lind, 2004).  The first three generations of war sought to defeat the 
enemy’s will with military power. However, the fourth generation of war will need to 
win on the moral, political, and social level rather than exclusively with military might 
(Lind, 2005).  Army leaders indicate that the nation may continue to be engaged in 
an era of persistent conflict, characterized by protracted confrontation among many 
players.  The tendency to employ violence to achieve political and ideological ends 
is not new, but modern networked terrorist cells pose new problems—particularly for 
a large, complex, and hierarchical bureaucracy (HQA, 2008).  As described by 
former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “the truth is, this will be a war like 
none other our nation has faced” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p. 1).  This declaration was an 
early indication of the changes our armed forces would have to make in order to 
adapt to this new war environment.  From an acquisition and contracting standpoint, 
there were initiatives set in place during the 1990s that should have supported this 
new environment; however, the training did not follow with the reform initiatives.  
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and adapt to increasing workload and responsibility.  The largest increase to the 
workload was in actions over $100,000, with an increase of 28% over the decade 
(DoD, 2000).  Despite workforce reductions of approximately 50% between 1990 
and 2001, the workload for the DoD acquisition community increased by 12% (GAO, 
2003).  As a result, the training and credentials of federal acquisition personnel 
suffered.  The DoD downsized the workforce without ensuring that remaining 
personnel had the specific skills and competencies needed to accomplish future 
DoD missions (GAO, 2008).  
This environment led to further problems when more and more expeditionary 
contracting professionals (or CCOs) were needed to support two major-scale 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Gansler report found that the expeditionary 
environment requires more trained and experienced military officers and non-
commissioned officers than they now have and that the Army is doing more with less 
people with an overall workload increase of 600% (USA, 2007).   
A senior NCO currently serving in a USSOCOM CCO billet stated that 
“reductions in the force directly correlate to problems with managing customer 
education, CCO authority, acquisition planning, and oversight.”  The CCO also noted 
that the force reductions don’t just affect contracting but have changed the “expected 
roles of personnel and overall reality of operations.”  An example provided by this 
CCO was that by deploying a limited number of CCOs at each location, the 
“standard contracting office structure is lost in a deployed environment.”  In his 
office, three CCOs, plus the chief of contracting (COCO), were supporting 58 
locations with over 290 actions, and obligated just less than $10 million in nine 
months.  This same senior NCO noted that the force reductions also drove 
“inadequately trained engineers” to write, inspect, and accept projects on behalf of 
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The Army has made advancements to addressing the recommendations laid 
out in the Gansler Report in terms of the acquisition workforce.  The Army has plans 
to hire an additional 1,400 contracting personnel (GAO, 2008, p. 9).  In July 2008, 
the Army approved a concept plan detailing a recruitment strategy that will further 
increase its workforce over the next few years.   In an attempt to attract new talent 
and to be able to hire personnel in an expedited manner, the US Army Material 
Command (AMC) has requested approval for direct-hire authority (Castellie, 2008).  
A major initiative for the Army to improve its Contracting workforce was the 
establishment of the Army Contracting Command.  General Benjamin Griffin, 
commander of the Army Contracting Command said the stand up of the organization 
was a “historic event, not because it was a new command but because the Army 
was demonstrating to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) leadership, 
Congress, and the American taxpayer that Army leadership was serious in taking 
steps to regain confidence in Army contracting and ensuring that it becomes one of 
the Army’s core competencies” (Leipold, 2008, p. 1).  Other improvements to 
contracting training from the Army include: Operational Contract Support (Joint 
Publication 4-10); Commanders Guide to Contracting Contractor Management (Field 
Manual 4-10); and Contract Support Brigade (Field Manual Interim 4-93.42).  The 
Army is also reexamining training curriculum for new acquisition officers and civilians 
(Parsons, 2008).  These initiatives will further the capabilities of Army CCOs; such 
an increase will, in turn, provide a larger and more qualified pool of support for 
USSOCOM missions. 
Through interviews with USSOCOM staff, the researcher found it apparent 
that USSOCOM does not have OPCON over its CCO tasking slots, nor is it 
responsible for a CCO’s training prior to his or her deployment under a USSOCOM 
billet. In fact, its CCO taskings come from the joint manning document (JMD) from 
the respective geographical combatant command (COCOM) in theatre.  The 
COCOM gets its CCOs out of the pool of deployable contracting professionals 
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noted that the Air Force is providing the majority of forces for all USSOCOM 
contracting deployments.  The stand up of the Army Contracting Command and 
comments above suggests that future USSOCOM billets will be filled by more Army 
CCOs.      
A joint initiative, brought about (at least in part) from the recommendation of 
the Gansler Report, has been the development, creation and publication of the 
Contingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century, which began 
distribution in February of 2008 throughout the DoD.  The handbook is made up of a 
hardcopy book and supporting DVD.  The intention is for the handbook to be revised 
each fiscal year to accommodate changing regulations, policies, and lessons 
learned from the OSD.  The second and latest version was published in December 
of 2008.   
The shortfall with this handbook is that there is no section devoted to unique 
USSOCOM policies or the complexities of construction contracting; in fact, there’s 
simply a page that defines the term construction (AFLMA, 2008).  A current 
USSOCOM CCO serving as the COCO noted in a questionnaire for this research 
that construction is significantly different when it is conducted in a deployed area, 
and that the existing Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Joint Contingency 
Contracting course (CON 234), used as the primary contingency contracting training, 
does not adequately cover construction. This CCO respondent felt construction 
should be the focus of at least one week of the course.  The past few decades have 
brought about change across the DoD in regard to specific training requirements and 
opportunities.    
2. Training 
From 1975 to 1990, the United States deployed its forces 26 times to various 
overseas contingencies. Post 1990, the number sky rocketed to over 70 
deployments supporting contingencies. These deployments indicated a need to have 
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a. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
In response to continuing concerns about the DoD’s ability to effectively 
manage its acquisition programs, Congress enacted the Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Action (DAWIA) on November 5, 1990 (10 USC 1701), in 
order to make the DoD acquisition workforce more professional.  The act established 
experience, training, education, and other qualifications for acquisition personnel 
(GAO, 1993, p. 1). 
Each acquisition position throughout the DoD is required to have a 
designated certification standard. Certification is the process by which DoD agencies 
determine whether an individual meets all the mandatory standards as they relate to 
education, experience and training. There are three established career levels within 
each associated career field, including contracting. The levels listed below identify 
the career levels as they relate to military acquisition positions (Master, 1995, slide 
5). 
 Level I (Basic Level) - This level is for individuals typically in grades E-
1 through E-5/O-1 through O-3. Basic-level training standards are 
designed to establish fundamental qualifications and expertise in the 
individual’s job series, functional area, or career field. Development at 
the basic level lays the foundation for career progression and is 
designed to prepare qualified, motivated personnel for positions of 
increased responsibility (Master, 1995, slide 6). 
 Level II (Intermediate Level) - This level is typically for individuals in 
grades E-6 through E-9/O-3 and O-4. At the beginning of the 
intermediate level, specialization is emphasized. Later, individuals 
broaden their background towards a more general understanding of 
the overall process in their career field. An individual’s experience in 
his/her primary career field should optimally be followed by a lateral 
movement to a related specialty (Master, 1995, slide 6). 
 Level III (Advanced Level) - This level is typically for individuals in 
grades E-9/O-4 and above. By the time they reach Level III, these 
individuals should have completed all the mandatory training and 
education requirements up to that level. Additionally, they should have 
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knowledge in their career field and a wide breadth of knowledge across 
the entire acquisition process (Master, 1995, slide 6). 
b. Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
The Defense Acquisition University was established on August 1, 1992. The 
DAWIA initiative allowed for a joint venture between existing Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Marine, and DoD schools. One of their primary functions was to standardize training 
among the different DoD acquisition communities. Through the DAU consortium, the 
military service schools would remain separate and distinct institutions, but certain 
mandatory courses would be managed centrally through DAU.  In an effort to 
expand the reach of many mandatory courses, DAU authorized the use of satellite 
facilities and internet courses. Many accredited universities and military service 
schools teach acquisition courses whereby students earn DAWIA certification 
through DAU equivalency courses (Luse et al., 2005, p. 47).  According to the most 
recent DAU Strategic Plan (DAU, 2009, p. 5) its core competencies include the 
following: multi-functional, applied, subject-matter expertise, unique curriculum 
development and rapid response capabilities, knowledge sharing, practitioner 
training, performance support, applied research, and acquisition career 
management. However, after reading this entire document and examining all of the 
transformational efforts going on at DAU, the researcher found three key words were 
missing from the plan: (1) construction (2) contingency and (3) contracting.  This 
suggests that although there are highly visible transformation efforts underway at 
DAU, these efforts do not include a strategic focus on training the acquisition 
workforce in construction elements of contingency contracting (DAU, 2009).  
c. Certification 
According to the online DAU catalog, the contracting career field includes the 
positions of contract negotiator, contract specialist, contract termination specialist, 
contract administrator, procurement analyst, administrative contracting officer, 
procuring contracting officer, contract price and/or construction analyst, contracting 
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Certification criteria are selected from education, experience, and training 
categories. Both the experience and training categories are required for certification, 
while education requirements may be waived. Some acquisition professionals feel 
that DAWIA certification has failed in its intended purpose and has done more to 
alienate the acquisition communities. Some argue that career certification has 
created an unintended result: namely, the completion of training programs and other 
certification requirements becoming an end in itself rather than a means to improve 
performance (Snider, 1996).  
d. Established Courses  
It is important that CCOs be provided with the training they need to excel 
during their assignments. CCOs need to apply sound procurement techniques, 
understand funding implications, and effectively administer their contracts while 
demonstrating exemplary integrity and ethics. CCOs help the DoD to accomplish its 
contingency mission and often funnel much-needed funds into regional economies 
(DAU, 2009, September 21). 
To this end, the DAU has offered CCOs some elective training courses. 
According to the DAU 2010 Catalog, CON 234 (Joint Contingency Contracting) 
develops skills for contracting support provided to joint forces across the full 
spectrum of military and disaster-relief operations. Exercises focus on unique 
aspects of contingency, critical thinking skills, and the execution of appropriate 
contractual instruments. The course is offered in residence only and lasts for 9 days.  
The Joint Contingency Contracting course is not currently a requirement for DAWIA 
certification and is not identified as part of the DAU transformation effort; however, it 
is the most utilized comprehensive resident training course offered in the field of 
contingency contracting. There is a follow-up online refresher course, CLC 114 
(Contingency Contracting Officer Refresher), also identified in the catalog.  Both 
classes are noted as electives for Level II DAWIA certification in contracting, 
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According to the SOAL-KA Contingency Cell, USSOCOMs standard 
operating procedure (SOP) is to only accept CCOs who have attained DAWIA Level 
II contracting certification.  Yet, as mentioned above, according to the DAU website 
(DAU, 2008), neither CON 234 (Contingency Contracting) nor CON 244 
(Construction Contracting) are requirements for Level II certification. However, both 
courses are specifically identified as being recommended “whenever practical” for 
those assuming duties in a related environment.   
According to a senior USSOCOM policy official, USSOCOM leaders’ 
preference is to utilize CCOs who have completed both CON 234 and CON 244; 
however, this is not always possible due to the short-notice nature of taskings and 
varying degree of priority given to these training programs throughout the military 
services.  Thus, there is no current written policy that CCOs must attend either of 
these courses in order to be placed in a position in which they may be managing 
complex construction requirements in a contingency environment.       
e. Training Effectiveness 
The researcher asked USSOCOM interview informants to rate the 
effectiveness of all previous pre-deployment CCO training (including DAU courses 
and unit training) on a scale of one to five, with one being not effective and five being 
optimally effective.  The average response was two, with not one member rating the 
effectiveness above a three.  This suggests that based on the most recent feedback 
from both USSOCM staff and CCO experience, the pre-deployment training does 
not result in optimum effectiveness.  Of the USSOCOM CCOs interviewed, all 
responded that their home station unit (all Air Force in this case) conducted 
contingency contracting training and addressed construction requirements. 
However, all respondents noted that such training was inadequate for the challenges 
faced on their USSOCOM deployment, and that the training did not address 
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As discussed in Chapter II, the complexity of contracted goods and services 
has increased over time; yet, the US armed forces have been engaged in 
construction in contingency environments since World War I. The training and 
credentials required by CCOs often place little to no requirement on an 
understanding of construction fundamentals or how to support construction 
requirements.  According to a senior USSOCOM staff member (in an interview with 
the researcher), most CCOs have “little to no construction experience and find 
themselves as the lead CCO for construction projects.” With all the regulations and 
policies in a joint environment, CCOs also get confused as to which documents they 
should be following. These inadequacies in contingency and construction concepts, 
along with the absence of USSOCOM-specific guidance, hinder the CCOs’ ability to 
be as effective as they would be with clear guidance. They lose valuable execution 
time while researching the necessary policies and procedures that apply to their 
situation.  The SOAK-K DoP feels that a construction-specific management module 
that incorporates USSOCOM contingency elements would help to mitigate these 
inadequacies.     
f. Standards 
Based on review of AARs and questionnaires of USSOCOM personnel, the 
researcher found evidence to suggest that CCOs are often confused as to what 
contract regulation and construction standard they should apply to various situations 
during their deployments.  A senior DCMA liaison officer (LNO) for USSOCOM noted 
that a CCO may not know which standards apply to which situation. This is a 
problem with both physical construction standards and contractual regulations and 
policy.  Confusion often exists as to whether JCC-I/A, CENTCOM, or USSOCOM 
policy prevails in any given contract action.  CCOs often have to apply whichever 
standard the local commander directs, rather than respective prescribed guidance.   
Several respondents noted that physical construction standards were the 
most difficult to understand and apply. One senior DCMA LNO for USSOCOM noted 
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and commanders’ expectations” vary greatly across the AOR.  Both the Army and 
Air Force have department-wide policies on deployed construction standards.  
However, these standards are often ignored or unavailable to deployed engineers.  
CCOs are not required to be experts in construction standards; therefore, they rely 
on the local subject-matter expert to determine the appropriate standard.  This poses 
a problem when he/she develops the contract.  If a contractor is not given a clear 
standard, it is difficult to enforce when the government goes to accept or reject the 
work.      
The SOAL-KA Division Chief noted during his interview with the researcher 
that based on his unit inspections, a CCO’s biggest shortfalls in following contract 
standards involve a lack of appropriate clauses within construction contracts, 
inadequate training of oversight personnel, and a lack of awareness of funding 
restrictions and the appropriate review thresholds for construction projects.  The 
division chief noted that his experience suggests that the lack of a documented 
contract standard for these items was the root cause of these shortfalls.  The 
division chief also noted that if CCOs had basic drawings specifications for 
commonly contracted construction projects (such as water wells and guard towers), 
they could better support their customers.  According to the division chief, a 
comprehensive management module focused on construction support would 
effectively mitigate these shortfalls and improve effectiveness of CCOs at all levels 
of experience.  Other interview respondents also noted various items that would be 
useful in a management module such as: references to current regulations and 
policies, templates for construction contracts (SOW, IGCE, drawings, specifications, 
liquidated damages (LD), determinations and findings (D&F), etc.), checklists for 
construction-specific pre-award, award, and post-award contract administration 
concerns, construction terminology fundamentals, and how to successfully execute 
construction contracting with local nationals.   
Contract administration is another area in which the standards vary 
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administration; however, throughout the contingency environments of today, DCMA 
is primarily focused on exclusively supporting the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP) contract and is not manned to provide post-award 
administration on other requirements (D. Graff, Commander, DCMA International, 
personal communication, September 2, 2009).  A recent IG report noted that the 
contracting organizations throughout Iraq and Afghanistan have consistently failed to 
adhere to FAR guidance associated with: adequately appointing and training 
oversight personnel, including appropriate clauses associated with construction 
contracting, the quality of Statements of Work (SOW), completing viable 
independent government cost estimates (IGE), and adequately justifying price 
reasonableness (IG D-2008-119, 2008).  According to the researcher’s interview 
with senior USSOCOM staff, the most recent PMRs further document that these 
issues are also trends throughout the USSOCOM AOR—including issues 
concerning inadequate drawings with construction projects and several incidences in 
which funding regulations were violated.   
3. Lessons Learned 
The changes in war and the joint dynamic of the deployed acquisition 
workforce have resulted in a vast network of CCOs with deployment experience, 
across all military services.  The lessons learned, rather positive or negative, during 
these deployments may often serve as a relative gold mine of information for CCOs 
who have limited deployment experience in a particular theatre or environment such 
as USSOCOM.  Compiling these lessons learned is challenging, but also critical to 
the future success and focused applicable training of personnel.   
a. The Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS)  
The joint uniform lessons learned system (JULLS) was developed to facilitate 
the evaluation of joint exercises. It is also frequently used to collect after-action 
reports for actual operations and contingencies and is the most commonly used 
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major commands often collect and archive additional after-action information and 
data. For example, AFFARS Appendix CC requires all Air Force CCOs to submit 
AARs to their HCA and to the Air Staff subsequent to each deployment. Similarly, 
the Army Center for Lessons Learned systematically collects on-site information on 
all major exercises and operations in which the Army participates (Luse et al., 2005, 
p. 51).   
b. Acquisition Community Connection (ACC) 
DAU has now created an online acquisition community connection (ACC)—a 
database in which AARs from all military services are stored.  This user-friendly, 
interactive website allows for registered users to access all submitted DoD, 
unclassified AARs prior to, during, or after their deployment (ACC, 2009).   
c. USSOCOM Contracting Portal 
USSOCOM has a similar model with its USSOCOM contracting portal.  This 
unsecured website is maintained by the SOAL-K organization and includes 
USSOCOM-specific AARs, SOPs, training documents, samples, and many other 
items to assist registered CCOs in collaborating lessons learned from their 
deployments.  The researcher found that one area missing from each of these 
lessons learned databases is comprehensive contingency contracting guidance 
dealing specifically with construction and the necessary integration of joint forces.   
B. (Processes) Contract Management Policy 
Once the workforce has been properly trained, processes must be 
established to provide an effective working environment.  This section will describe 
several elements of contracting policy as it relates to establishing and maintaining 
appropriate processes for contract management.  First, the researcher will explain 
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 Then, the policy requirements as a result of the increased number of contractor 
support on the battlefield will be described.  Finally, the researcher will identify 
oversight policy and the problems faced with executing effective oversight 
processes.       
1. Integration of Contracting into Planning  
According to the Gansler Report, “USSOCOM has recognized the importance 
of expeditionary contracting to the successful completion of its mission” (USA, 2007, 
p. 40). The SOAL-KCC develops policies and doctrine to facilitate the success of 
deployed CCOs. KCC also provides review and approval of large-dollar actions to 
ensure compliance with statutory and regulatory guidance. The real-time 
involvement of this cell includes: properly collecting and reporting field contracting 
data, identifying lessons learned and using them to update policies, guidance, and/or 
developing training as appropriate.  This involvement does not constitute perfection 
in their processes; in fact, it has identified several gaps in the capabilities of CCOs, 
as discussed (in part) in the section on people earlier in this report.  Requesting 
support from NPS for a management module is an example of the KCC conducting 
responsible leadership and seeking out continuous improvement.  The staff 
conducts regular visits to units to perform informal audits and PMRs. It was as a 
result of these PMRs that the SOAL-KA division chief identified the need for 
additional integration of contracting into the acquisition planning process.  
Acquisition planning includes: generating a viable requirement description, 
conducting market research, planning pro-actively versus re-actively, writing an 
adequate SOW, developing performance measurements, allocating and training 
qualified oversight personnel adequately.   
In addition to meeting with the deployed contracting unit, the KCC staff often 
maintains open communication with the SOF units the CCOs support.  This forum 
provides a clear opportunity for the staff to discuss shortfall issues directly with the 
warfighter.  The Gansler Report found that “the USSOCOM KCC is a useful example 
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accomplishment of the overall mission (USA, 2007, p. 24).  Even with successful 
accomplishment of the overall mission, there are still areas of improvement that 
were identified during staff audits and PMRs regarding the integratation of 
contracting into planning.  The Ganlser Report also noted an overall lack of 
integration of contracting into planning (USA, 2007, p. 40).  The researcher asked 
one fielded questionnaire respondent (with over 10 years experience in contracting 
and five CENTCOM AOR deployments) to comment on lessons learned concerning 
the effectiveness (lack of effectiveness) of acquisition planning. He stated: 
“Acquisition planning is minimal at best.  Acquisitions are typically knee-jerk 
reactions to requirements and [are] pushed to contracting for immediate action.”  
When the researcher asked the SOCENT chief of contracting the same question, he 
stated: “[acquisition planning] is extremely effective when the CCO is included in the 
planning stages of [the] requirement, but it is only effective when the CCO and/or 
customer both possess the experience to know how to execute the requirement 
properly.”  This response suggests that simply integrating customers and CCOs is 
an important part, but that both parties must also be properly trained in their 
respective roles.  The Gansler Report found that “translating a commander’s 
requirement into a SOW serves as the basis for a binding contract” and that “during 
expeditionary operations, the focus of the contracting process is on contract award, 
with […contract] management being neglected.” (USA, 2008, p. 39). This reference 
to contract management includes both post-award administration and requirement-
generation during pre-award planning.  Despite the critical role that contracting plays 
in expeditionary operations, CCOs are not always brought into the requirement-
generation process, nor are commanders trained on how to adequately define their 
requirements. “The importance of the ability to translate a combatant officer’s 
requirement into a responsive contract SOW cannot be overstated” (USA, 2008, p. 
40). An experienced CCO familiar with the requirement can often help write a basic 
SOW. However, the inability to generate an effective SOW is due to a lack of trained 
personnel who can translate their commander’s intent into a requirement that can 
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underscores the importance of having a requirements-development process that 
brings the experts to the table during the planning and post-award periods of a 
contract. Stated another way, although the Services conduct operational planning, 
they fail to train on a key component to that planning process—contract-
requirements development (USA, 2007). 
2. Increased Reliance on Contractor Support  
This section provides details outlining the increase over time of contractor 
support on the battlefield.  This is important to managing processes and policies 
because increased contractors on the battlefield often present cultural sensitivity 
issues and additional legal considerations for commanders.  Contractors are not 
treated the same as military personnel, nor do commanders have the same authority 
over contractors as they do over military personnel.   
While numbers of contractor and military personnel are ever-changing and 
are difficult to track exactly, legislation has spurred improved tallying and tracking of 
contractor personnel. For example, Sections 815 and 854 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364); section 3305 of the US 
Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28); and section 861 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) have each 
required the DoD to issue reports detailing the use of contractors operating in-
theater and the policies that govern them (as cited in DoD, 2007; 2008).   
Contractors play a substantial role in supporting the US in military, 
reconstruction, and diplomatic operations in Iraq (among other places)—accounting 
for a significant portion of the manpower and spending for such activities.  The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), at the request of the Senate Committee on the 
Budget, studied the use of contractors in theatre to support US activities in Iraq 
(2009).  Under their report, the CBO considered the following areas to be part of the 
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Arab Emirates. While USSOCOM operates globally, and this report was specifically 
targeted at the Iraq theatre, this geological classification suggests an overall 
increased reliance on contractors supporting war efforts over time and helps to 
quantify the level of current contractor involvement.  For this reason, the findings 
within the CBO report were used as the primary source for analysis in this section.  
Unless otherwise noted, all information within this section comes from the website 
containing the aforementioned report (CBO, 2009).    
a. Expenditures 
From 2003 through 2007, US agencies awarded $85 billion in contracts for 
work to be principally performed in the Iraq theater, accounting for almost 20% of 
funding for operations in Iraq. More than 7% of those awards were for contracts 
performed within Iraq.  The DoD-awarded contracts totaled $76 billion, while the 
USAID and the Department of State (DoS) obligated roughly $5 billion and $4 billion, 
respectively, over the same time period.  
b. Scope and Magnitude 
Although the use of contractors during military operations is well established, 
most experts agree that the scale of the deployment of contractor personnel in the 
Iraq theater (relative to the number of military personnel in the country) is 
unprecedented in US history. Historical data on numbers of contractor personnel in-
theater support that conclusion.  The current ratio of contractor to military personnel 
in the Iraq theater is 1 to 1—higher than it has been during any other major US 
military operation (see Figure 9). In the 1990s, US operations in the Balkans 
illustrated the potential extent of the successful use of contractors during future 
conflicts. The ratio of contractor to military personnel in the Balkans was also about 
1 to 1, but those operations involved no more than 20,000 US military personnel at 
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CONFLICT CONTRACTOR MILITARY RATIO OF  
Revolutionary War 2 9 1:6 
War of 1812 Not Available 38 Not Available 
Mexican-American 6 33 1:6 
Civil War 200 1,000 1:5 
Spanish-American Not Available 35 Not Available 
World War I 85 2,000 1:24 
World War II 734 5,400 1:7 
Korea 156 393 1:2.5 
Gulf War 9 500 1:5 
Balkans 20 20 1:1 
Iraq Theater: Early 190 200 1:1 
 
Figure 9. Presence of Contractor Personnel during US Military Operations 
(CBO, 2009; Epley, 1990, pp. 30-35; Zamparelli, 1999, pp. 10-19;  
DoD, 2007, p. 12) 
The historically high ratio of contractor personnel to military personnel in the 
Iraq theater is the result of several factors. In response to reductions in the size of 
the post-Cold War military, the DoD augmented its force structure by relying more 
heavily on contractors for support functions—for example, through LOGCAP (CBO, 
2005, pp. 16–21). Those contractors perform functions in-theater that would 
otherwise require the deployment of additional military personnel. The extent of the 
DoD’s contracting is particularly evident during prolonged, large-scale operations—
like those in Iraq—in which there may not be enough military personnel available to 
provide logistics support.  
On the basis of data collected from the DoD, DoS, and USAID, the CBO 
estimates that at least 190,000 contractor personnel work in the Iraq theater on 
contracts funded by the United States.  The ratio of US-funded contractor employees 
to members of the US military in the Iraq theater is, therefore, approximately 1 to 1, 
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DoD, DoS, and USAID as prime contractors, as well as subcontractor personnel for 
the DoD.  About 20% (38,700) of all contractor personnel working in the Iraq theater 
are US citizens (see Figure 10). Local nationals account for roughly 40% of the 
theater’s contractor population (70,500 and 81,000, respectively). Figure 10 
illustrates these demographics.  
 US Citizens Local Nationals (a) 
Third Country 
Nationals (b) 
DoD (c) 36,100 66,300 77,400 
DoS 2,300 1,300 3,100 
USAID 200 2,900 300 
Other agencies (d) 200 100 300 
TOTAL 38,700 70,500 81,000 
Figure 10. Number of Personnel Working in Iraq Theatre 
(CBO, 2009)  
NOTES: 
a.  Local Nationals: Citizens of the country in which they are working. 
b. Third country nationals: Neither US citizens nor citizens of local nations. 
c. DoD data includes prime contractors and subcontractors, including those working of the Army Corps 
of Engineers.  The DoS, USAID, and other agencies do not track subcontractor employees and are, 
therefore, not included.  
d. Other agencies: Includes Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, 
Interior, Justice, Transportation, and Treasury, as well as Broadcasting Board of Governors and the 
General Services Administration (GSA).   
c. Regulation and Policy 
More generally, the US government placed greater emphasis in recent 
decades on outsourcing activities to the private sector that are not inherently 
governmental. The government’s policy is to subject services identified as 
commercial to the forces of competition (OMB, 2003).  In addition, the current ratio 
of contractor personnel to military personnel reflects the United States’ attempt to 
reconstruct while military activities are under way, rather than delaying rebuilding 
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d. Cultural Considerations 
The significant number of contract workers in-theatre highlights the critical 
need for counting, tracking, and maintaining oversight of these workers (CBO, 
2009).  It also increases the footprint of local/foreign nationals into operations, 
suggesting that awareness and practice of cultural sensitivity are important to 
maintaining support from these workers.  Representatives at all levels have the 
responsibility to maintain cultural awareness when dealing with contractors.  One 
interview informant told the researcher that “dealing with foreign nationals is very 
different than dealing with stateside contractors.”  A different culture is one of many 
differences experienced by CCOs dealing with forgein nationals.  According to 
USSOCOM leadership, these differences should be respected and integrated into 
how a CCO does business while in a foreign country.    
e. Legal Considerations 
Contractors on the battlefield present challenges to military leadership in 
terms of authority and a clear process for managing contractor personnel (CBO, 
2009).  Regarding legal considerations associated with contractor personnel, the 
CBO found that Military commanders have less direct authority over the actions of 
contractor personnel than over their military or civilian government subordinates. 
Contractors’ duties are set out in their contract, which is managed by a government 
contracting officer, not the military commander. 
The legal status of contractor personnel is uncertain, particularly for those 
who are armed. Contractor personnel are potentially subject to a number of laws and 
jurisdictions, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, the Special Maritime and Territorial 
Jurisdiction Act of the United States, and the USA Patriot Act, although very few 
cases are on record applying these laws (CBO, 2009). 
Although military commanders can directly control the actions of military 
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personnel is indirect. Military personnel are subject to criminal punishment if they fail 
to obey a lawful order from their military commanders. On the other hand, 
government civilians may fall under the control of military commanders either 
permanently or temporarily during a conflict, but only under extraordinary 
circumstances would they be subject to administrative actions, such as suspension 
or termination, if they failed to obey an order. Military commanders may change the 
daily tasks and duties of military and civilian DoD employees within the usual military 
chain of command, subject broadly to the laws and regulations of the United States. 
The commander can only give orders that are consistent with US laws and 
regulations (USC, 2008). The commander and employees may also be subject to 
local laws, depending on the content of treaties and status-of-forces agreements. In 
practice, that authority enables the military commander to allocate the personnel 
under his or her command among any number of tasks those personnel are able 
and trained to do. The military commander may also request that additional 
personnel be reassigned from other parts of the government if necessary.  By 
contrast, the duties of contractor personnel are set out in a fixed, written contract 
(DoD, 2005, section 6.1.4; Vernon, 2004, p. 369) and are not subject to military 
commander directives. Contracts are governed by statues, case law, the FAR and 
its supplements (GAO, 2008).  
3. Oversight  
The CCO is the official designee of the head of the agency for binding the 
government on matters related to a particular contract (DoD, 2005, section 6.3.3; 
GSA, 2009, 48 C.F.R. 1.602). However, the CCO may not have access to the place 
of performance if that place is remote or dangerous or if it covers a large geographic 
area (GAO, 2008).  Instead, he or she may rely on a technical representative, 
usually a military member of the unit being supported and collocated with the 
contractor.  DFARS 201.602-2 notes that the technical representative interacts 
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oversight performance but is not an authority for adjusting the scope or size of the 
contract (GSA, 2009). 
 “The inability (of the government) to monitor contractor performance and 
enforce contracts is a critical problem in an expeditionary environment” (USA, 2007, 
p. 15).  The researcher found overwhelming evidence to suggest there is clearly a 
trend throughout the contingency contracting environment of problems associated 
with inadequate oversight of contractor performance.  The majority of all literature 
reviewed noted this problem (with no sources showing positive trends in this area); 
every individual interviewed brought up this concern; and, every questionnaire 
fielded included multiple responses identifying oversight as being one the most 
challenging problems to address in a contingency environment. In addition, the 
researcher found that every USSOCOM AAR reviewed dating back to 2001 noted 
this as a concern.   
The documented failures ranged from lack of adequate documentation of 
appointment and training of oversight personnel to the government’s inability to even 
provide oversight personnel.  These failures could potentially lead to unfulfilled 
responsibilities on the part of the government.  If the government cannot perform the 
oversight identified in the contract terms and conditions, it often has a direct affect 
on a CCO’s ability to enforce contractor performance terms.  Contractors in 
expeditionary environments often perform at levels different from those conformed to 
by military personnel.  Without oversight and occasional guidance, contractors could 
make early mistakes in judgment or performance that could be easily avoidable if the 
government representative is performing prudent due diligence in regards to the 
contract.  One USSOCOM CCCO, a senior NCO with five deployments to his credit, 
noted that construction requirements often have “minimal oversight due to 
continuous stress on other career fields and a lack of manning.”  This CCO noted 
that typically the SME cannot be present; therefore, the customer sends an under-
qualified person to conduct oversight.  This ad-hoc oversight by the government, 
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acceptance. Oversight is conducted by a CCO through responsible contract 
management and by the CCO’s appointed representative through delegated 
authorities of on-site inspections and acceptance.        
a. Contract Management 
“Contract management is the essential post-award contracting function to 
ensure mission accomplishment and to ensure that the Government obtains the 
required work on time and at the quality level called for by the contract” (USA, 2007, 
p. 27). It is also an important control over fraud, waste, and abuse.  A CCO is 
responsible for contract management.  The CCO ensures that both the government 
and contractor fulfill their respective roles outlined in the terms and conditions of the 
contract.  This can involve monitoring progress schedules, documenting government 
acceptance of goods and services, reviewing material submittals from the contractor, 
approving invoice payments, etc.  The CCO must establish and oversee the contract 
management processes.  This process includes but is not limited to: in-scope 
change-order management procedures (what to do if the customers needs to 
change the requirement after award), steps to ensure proper funding is available and 
properly certified for contract actions that will obligate money, routine (weekly, 
monthly, etc.) meetings between contractor personnel and government personnel to 
discuss schedules and other concerns with the contract, having a process in place 
for government personnel to approve material submittals provided by contractors, 
and having appropriate personnel trained and appointed for performance oversight.  
There are reported cases in which there were no personnel trained to monitor and 
ensure that the contractor was performing or providing the contracted requirement 
needed by the warfighter.  This neglect can cause difficulties; for instance, a CCO 
would not know whether a contractor had actually performed the requirements 
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b. Delegated Authorities 
In expeditionary contracting, there are several designations for personnel 
other than the CCO responsible for oversight on contracts in the contingency 
environment. The particular term used for oversight personnel varies across the 
military services, with contracting officer representatives (COR) being the most 
common for USSOCOM operations. Other names include: contracting officers 
technical representative (COTR), or quality assurance personnel/evaluator (QAP/E) 
(used most often to refer to oversight of services contracts).  A customer is 
responsible for nominating a subject-matter expert (SME) for the CCO to train and 
appoint as the COR (or designated term for the AOR) to a particular contract.  This 
SME is then assigned to perform oversight responsibilities throughout the life of the 
contract.  The SME is also given the authority for final acceptance of goods and 
services; however, this individual is not given the authority to obligate funds on 
behalf of the government.  In special cases, there are SME personnel assigned for 
construction projects in which a CCO may delegate obligation authority up to 
$25,000.  These SMEs are known as Project Planning Officers (PPO).  A PPO can 
be used in environments in which SOF units are isolated from the contacting office.  
If the SOF unit has a qualified engineer attached to it, that engineer may be 
appointed as a PPO with the proper training and delegation provided by a warranted 
CCO.   
An essential link in construction projects is the COR (also called COTR).  This 
person is the on-site SME who should be viewing the contractor’s performance 
frequently enough to remedy any perceived problems with performance before they 
compromise the overall project.  The COR should have clear and open 
communication with both the contractor and the CCO.  The COR should also clearly 
understand the contract terms and conditions, including the SOW.  The delegated 
authority to CORs allows for them to direct the contractor within those terms and 
conditions.  The COR is a valuable asset to the acquisition team because of his/her 
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on-site with the contractor much more frequently that a CCO could be. CCOs often 
have numerous projects in multiple locations and could not possibly manage or 
oversee the daily performance by the contractor, nor are they experts in 
construction.  Based on regulatory guidance within DFARS 201.602-2 and DoD 
Directive 550.7R, a COR is intended to be a qualified individual appointed by the 
CCO to assist in the technical monitoring or administration of a contract.  This 
guidance is not specific in what exact qualifications are needed.  As mentioned 
above, the customer is responsible for nominating a qualified SME to best represent 
the needs of the requesting unit.  When a CCO appoints the nominated COR, the 
CCO documents in the appointed letter that contract oversight should be a priority in 
the individual’s daily duty. However, this position is often assigned as an additional 
duty and often requires no formal experience.  Those who fill it are often young 
service members with little to no training, simply tasked from a functional unit who 
owns the requirement.  The turnover is high among CORs, leaving many gaps in 
contract coverage (USA, 2007).  Likewise, a fragmented and conflicted chain of 
command exists with delegated oversight personnel.  According to the AARs the 
researcher reviewed, CORs and other oversight personnel often have higher priority 
mission objectives other than their COR additional duty.  Although CORs are 
formally appointed by the CCO, these positions do not fall under the CCO’s 
command.  CCOs often provide documentation of appointment and training at the 
onset of contract award to one person, and then have to continually track that 
person down or adjust when the functional unit commander re-prioritizes projects 
and/or personnel.  “The communication trail and oversight control is complex in (the 
deployed) theatre. Mission success or failure is often dependent on effective 
oversight of contracts. Construction is at the top of the list of core competencies that 
need to be developed in order for SMEs to be available to fill COR slots” (CDR 
David Graff, Commander–DCMA International, personal communication, July 29, 
2009).  “If the government can’t abide by and enforce its own terms and conditions 
of a contract, it’s hard to legally enforce the performance terms required by the 
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USSOCOM staff members also noted CORs and other oversight areas as a 
concern throughout their AOR.  One senior member stated: “PPOs and CORs from 
the engineer units are often put in charge of construction requirement generation 
and oversight with little to no training on the type of construction on contract.”  The 
examples respondents used frequently included the use of bridge demolition experts 
for oversight on building living facilities and the use of paving experts on electrical 
and plumbing projects.  When these individuals are the last link in making a 
determination if a contractor has performed IAW the contract terms and conditions, 
inadequate work is often accepted.  Based on feedback from USSOCOM personnel 
interviews and field questionnaires, the researcher has found that this generally 
“causes a great deal of re-work and frustration on the part of both the commanders 
and the CCOs” (according to an interview with the researcher).  According to the 
SOAL-KCC Division Chief, a standardized document showing the roles and 
responsibilities of oversight personnel is needed.  CCOs on the ground also 
expressed a need for functional units to assign personnel for contract oversight 
duties prior to deployment, then send them through a comprehensive training 
program directed by their chain of command.   
C. (Platform) Synergistic Approach 
1. Cross-service  
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) brought organizational changes to the 
execution of contingency contracting between the military services in a truly joint 
environment that may potentially improve future support. One of the most intriguing 
observations is the integration of contingency contracting personnel between the 
military services at the tactical level, which is common at the strategic and 
operational levels, but not very common at the tactical level (Luse et al., 2005). 
Today, the contracting workforce is based on the application of rules 
established in statutes, case law, the FAR and its supplements, when operational 
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exceptions to the rules. These exceptions are applied differently in different 
environments.  Not only do the military services apply the FAR differently, but these 
diverse organizations (such as CENTCOM service AORs, JCC I/A, Army Corps of 
Engineers, and USSOCOM) often differ on how particular regulatory requirements 
are applied (USA, 2007).  That is the challenge for CCOs who support multi-service 
and multi-organizations during their careers—adaptation to changing regulations 
across different organizations is essential to streamlining operations and maintaining 
compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.        
The FAR system was established for codification and publication of uniform 
policies and procedures for federal acquisition at all executive agencies.  The 
problem is there is not uniform application of these policies and procedures across 
agencies; each agency has a degree of latitude and flexibility to adapt the regulation 
for its respective operational needs. For example, the DoD military services have 
multiple levels of exceptions and restrictions for contracting outside of the CONUS.  
A CCO may often be trained and experienced in one agency or department, yet 
deploy under USSOCOM, which has its own variation of regulations within the 
Special Operations Command Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(SOFARS).  SOFARS provides minimum essential implementation of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS). The 
SOFARS applies to all CCOs that receive contracting authority from USSOCOM. 
USSOCOM has a very reliable and aggressive set of internal control 
procedures IAW DoD Instruction 5010.40.  These procedures enforce basic FAR 
compliance” (USA, 2007, p. 7). However, there isn’t a USSOCOM CCO policy to 
bring together and clarify the various layers of regulations and (exceptions to those 
regulations) in which USSOCOM CCOs must operate.  Per USSOCOM staff officers, 
this leaves the CCOs to operate in an ad-hoc manner in terms of navigating through 
the thousands of pages of regulations.  Contracting is a compliance-based process 
and profession (R.G. Rendon, personal communication, March 2, 2009).  
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acquisition rules that can be immediately referenced and applied to exceptional 
contracting requirements and special provisions of expeditionary operations (USA, 
2007).    
2. Cross-functional  
When the SOAL-K DoP was interviewed for this project, he specifically noted 
the importance that USSOCOM CCOs interact and facilitate a synergistic 
relationship with other functional areas such as finance and engineering.  These 
stakeholders each have different interests, policies and procedures through which 
contracting professionals must navigate in order to facilitate a successful acquisition 
cycle.   
a. Finance 
During the researcher’s interview with the SOAL-K staff, the DoP specifically 
identified funding as an item in which his CCOs need better cross-functional 
involvement and awareness, and as an area that he would like to see included in the 
management module.  The DoP noted that this can be a very daunting area for 
CCOs, as there are numerous financial regulations and agency policies associated 
with the appropriate use of funding.  The application of these may or may not be 
clear in a given situation.  
(1) MPF-11.   
As mentioned in Chapter III, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1986 
established the concept of USSOCOM. A year later, the 1987 Nunn-Cohen 
Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act formally created USSOCOM and 
established the military service-component support roles, while providing substantial 
autonomy for SOF—including unique budget and procurement authority.  This 
authority sets USSOCOM apart from traditional COCOMs.  The authority builds in 
speed and flexibility for CCOs, though it also poses a challenge to them as they try 
to ensure the proper execution of these special funds.  Similar to the authorities 
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commander the responsibility and authority to develop and acquire SOF-peculiar 
equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the 
authority to execute funds.  USSOCOM uses special appropriation funding known as 
major force progam-11 (MFP-11).  The USSOCOM CCO warrants only provide 
authority to spend MFP-11 funds on SOF-peculiar requirements.  In his interview 
with the researcher, the USSOCOM staff legal advocate stated that this is an area in 
which CCOs must be careful.  Other functional areas often come to USSOCOM 
CCOs for contracting support, knowing that the MFP-11 funding rules are less 
restrictive in terms of speed, review thresholds, and approval.  Based on his 
experience, the staff legal advocate told the researcher that personnel in other 
functional areas may put pressure on USSOCOM CCOs to procure goods and 
services not actually specific to the USSOCOM mission.  Spending MFP-11 funds 
for non-USSOCOM missions is a clear misuse of the funding authority and is 
prohibited the SOFFARS.  In addition, this special funding has subordinate 
categories of spend for specific uses and must be allocated accordingly.  
(2)  “Money as a Weapon System” 
All appropriated funds are subject to three basic fiscal constraints: time, 
purpose, and amount.  Failure to execute funding within these constraints could 
result in breach of the Bona-Fide Need Rule, Mis-Appropriations Act, or the Anti-
Deficiency Act respectfully (AFLMA, 2008, p. 56).  On the other hand, there are 
several specifics within the various funding regulations that allow for flexibility and 
exceptions to standard procedures.  The most comprehensive overview of these 
regulations was compiled by the Comptroller for the Multi-National Command-Iraq in 
2005, with his smart book briefing entitled Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS), 
to which USSOCOM Staff often refer CCOs for clarification on funding policies 
(Aaron, 2005).  In this briefing, the comptroller stated that:  
… effective application of all available resources is vital to the success 
of our mission. The concept of Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) 
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on the battlefield, apply and employ money as a non-lethal weapon 
system to maximize operational effects at minimal cost. (Aaron, 2005)   
While the primary responsibility for funding concerns falls within the finance 
functional area, evidence suggests that contracting and CCOs play a critical part in 
overseeing the application of funding on contractual obligations; therefore, CCOs 
need to be apprised of the regulations and policies associated with funding.   
Contracts throughout Iraq and Afghanistan have been incrementally funded 
unnecessarily, causing increased contracting workload and inefficient operations.  
The Gansler Report found that people in the field identified this as a major problem 
hampering their efforts to support the warfighter (USA, 2007).  If there were a more 
efficient and reliable funding stream, CCOs might be able to negotiate better deals 
with contractors.  Even though that the over-burdening of contracting personnel is 
currently documented, incremental funding is occurring at monthly or, in some 
cases, shorter intervals.  This leads to an unnecessary increase in workload for the 
CCOs because modifications to the contract must be processed and additional 
administration steps must be taken each time funding is applied to the contract. One 
solution recommended by the Gansler Report was to use an approach similar to 
what was used in the Balkans, known as the “Overseas Contingency Operations 
Transfer Fund.”  This essentially is a pot of money adequately resourced up-front 
without usage or fiscal year limitations (USA, 2007, p. 25).    
(3) Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) 
The first layer of defense in accurately certifying funding for appropriate use is 
the joint acquisition review board (JARB). This is a J4 board that validates O&M 
funding requirements estimated at $200,000 or more. The JARB validates 
requirements less than $200,000 in specific areas including (but not limited to) 
engineer equipment, facilities, and LOGCAP (Aaron, 2005).  At larger expeditionary 
bases, contracting personnel have a seat on this board; however, in smaller, more 
austere locations, a CCO may receive a requirement that was either validated 
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representative.  Per the AARs on file with USSOCOM, CCOs operating within an 
AOR with a functioning JARB had less incidences of misused funds.   
b. Engineering 
For construction taking place on or around DoD installations in an 
expeditionary environment, the Engineering Corps is critical.  The engineers are the 
planners, designers, and overseers of construction projects and operate side by side 
with CCOs.  Below is a summary of the key decision bodies per the MAAWS briefing 
(Aaron, 2005).7 
(1) Joint Facility Utilization Board (JFUB) 
This is a J7 board that oversees requirements for construction and base 
camp development, including MILCON, minor construction using OMA, real estate 
actions, and other engineering requirements.   
(2)  Facilities Engineering Team (FET)  
After review/validation by the JFUB, the requirement is approved by the 
facilities engineering team (FET) members, who determine which contracting agency 
is appropriate for the work: SFO CCOs, local RCC, DCMA, USACE, USAID, or 
another organization. (IG report, 2008) 
(3) Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB) 
The JCMEB validates CERP requirements greater than $500,000.  The 
JCMEB also recommends approval or disapproval to the appropriate approval 
authority for a respective AOR. 
Per the USSOCOM Staff, depending on how robust the SOF presence is in 
the AOR, the USSOCOM CCO may or may not be required to utilize some or all of 
these review channels. However, in more sustained areas—in which SOF are more 
integrated with large installations—the USSOCOM CCO is bound by these policies.  
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review boards are adequately documented in past AARs.  Interviews with 
respondents suggested that CCOs currently react to these activities in an ad-hoc 
manner based on the Chief of Contracting directives at each office location.   
3. Agency Interoperability 
In addition to cross-functional cooperation, interoperability between 
USSOCOM CCOs and agencies such as DCMA, JCC I/A, and other cooperative 
agencies conducting contingency contracting in its AOR was noted as a top concern 
for the SOAL-K DoP.  In his interview with the researcher, the director specifically 
expressed concern for CCOs being able to meet mission objectives in the most 
effective manner while exercising synergy with these other agencies. 
a. Splintered Responsibility 
The Gansler Report addressed the importance of synergy and documented 
numerous problems with splintered responsibilities in theater between key players 
such as AMC, LOGCAP, Army Corps of Engineers, JCC I/A, DCMA, CENTCOM, 
USAID, Department of State and many more (USA, 2007).  Furthermore, the report 
noted that after examining the entire landscape of acquisition issues in Kuwait, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, the members of the commission found that the problems 
experienced in an expeditionary environment are not due to one particular problem 
nor an individual failure to perform (USA, 2007).  Rather, multiple agencies and 
departments having failed to fully recognize or comprehensively address the 
significance of the shifting challenges from the post-Cold War environment to one in 
which state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents (USA, 2007; 
Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).    
b. Multiple Stakeholders 
Contracting involves multiple stakeholders, including the warfighter, financial 
management, contracting, engineering, and contractor(s). Combined, these 
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cover all the various contracting processes nor provide the necessary deliverables—
which include a defined requirement, statement of need, funding certification, a 
contract, contract modifications, award management, oversight of performance, and 
acceptance documentation (USA, 2007).  These actions take place during pre-
award, award, and post-award phases of contracting.  The stakeholders play an 
integral role due to the inability of a CCO to be an expert in every subject area 
needing contract support.    
D.   Filling the Gaps  
This report found that some of the biggest effectiveness gaps that arise when 
CCOs are executing construction requirements include: inadequate training of 
personnel, confusing contract management policies and construction management 
standards, non-compliant contracts (e.g., a failure to include the appropriate clauses 
and drawings), deficient acquisition planning and integration of contracting into 
operational planning, insufficient oversight of work and poor interaction between 
units.   
A Construction Management Module focused on fulfilling these gaps while 
integrating the joint-force environment will allow even a relatively inexperienced 
CCO to better manage his/her environment and more effectively support SOF. 
This project fulfilled two primary goals:  
(1) Examined the contingency contracting environment concerning 
expeditionary construction requirements.  
 
(2) Provided recommendations to address problems in the field.  Among 
these recommendations was the development of a prototype tactical 
training handbook for CCOs to better manage the contingency 
contracting process for construction requirements.  This training 
handbook is known as the USSOCOM Construction Management 
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The existing operational environment was analyzed in order to answer the 
following research questions:   
1. What are the Gaps in the Effectiveness of Contingency 
Contracting with Respect to Executing Construction 
Requirements?   
a. The Gaps in “People” 
This research suggests there are systemic problems with the training of 
personnel assigned to execute construction requirements.  These personnel include 
both the acquisition workforce and operational units tasked with developing and 
overseeing this workforce’s requirements. Recent changes in the acquisition 
workforce and overall manning shortages among operational and support units have 
left a void in the priority and availability of adequate training.  Personnel associated 
with executing construction requirements in a contingency environment lack the 
appropriate certification and training in fundamental construction contracting policy 
and basic construction standards.  The researcher discovered that most USSOCOM 
CCOs have little to no construction experience and yet find themselves as the lead 
CCO for construction requirements.  In addition, the contingency environment 
presents numerous conflicting regulations and policies for which a uniform standard 
for USSOCOM does not exist.  This lack of uniformity exists in both contracting 
policies and construction standards.   
Several respondents to fielded questionnaires noted that physical 
construction standards were the most difficult to understand and apply.  While the 
application of construction standards is the responsibility of the engineer, CCOs play 
a vital role in ensuring that those standards are adequately reflected in the contract 
terms and conditions.  If a contractor is not given a clear standard to follow, it is 
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USSOCOM staff inspections suggested that a CCO’s biggest shortfalls in 
following contract standards involve lack of the appropriate clauses in construction 
contracts, inadequate training of oversight personnel, and a lack of awareness of 
funding restrictions and review thresholds for construction projects.  Questionnaire 
respondents and interviewed informants further identified other shortfall areas: 
failure to reference current regulations, lack of templates for assisting in design and 
development of SOWs and IGEs, absence of checklists for phases of construction 
contracting, and a lack of understanding of basic construction terminology used by 
end-users and contractors.  Finally, contingency contracting lessons learned are 
compiled at various levels of command.  These lessons learned often reflect 
recurring problems throughout the same locations over time.  This research 
suggests a failure to adequately integrate these lessons learned into current training 
programs.     
b. The Gaps in “Processes” 
This research suggests that the way in which contract management policy is 
handled throughout the contingency environment is inadequate for achieving 
optimum effectiveness.  To begin with, contracting has been historically left out of 
the planning process in terms of acquisition and operational planning.  This 
inadequacy has lead CCOs to a re-active approach to executing contract 
management policies and processes.   
The failure to integrate contracting was magnified when the DoD increasingly 
relied on contractors to support battlefield objectives.  Over the last ten years, this 
reliance has increased in expenditure, scope, and magnitude.  This increase has 
brought new cultural and legal ramifications for our commanders on the ground as 
they operate and manage their contracts.  An increase in the contractors on the 
battlefield leads to an increase in the importance of cultural sensitivity, an increase in 
the administration burden on CCOs and their representatives, and a decrease in the 
command-and-control abilities of commanders.  The increase in contractors has also 
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CCOs are often not physically at the location where a contract is performed.  
This leads to increased numbers of CORs to oversee the work and coordinate with 
contractors.  The documented failures in oversight ranged from lack of adequate 
appointment documentation and of oversight personnel training to the government’s 
inability to provided oversight personnel.  Contractors in a contingency environment 
often perform at levels different from those conformed to by military personnel or 
stateside contractors.  Without oversight and occasional guidance, contractors could 
make early mistakes in judgment or performance that could be easily avoidable if the 
government had performed due diligence in regards to oversight.  This research 
suggests that oversight control is complex in a contingency theatre, yet mission 
success or failure is often dependent on effective oversight of contracts.  With 
conflicting guidance and policy in the area of oversight, CCOs and their delegated 
representatives often behave in an ad-hoc fashion in terms of how they develop and 
execute the contract oversight process.  
c. The Gaps in “Platform” 
This research suggests that an overall lack of a synergistic approach to joint 
operations has hindered a CCO’s ability to effectively perform in a contingency 
environment.  Personnel tasked as CCOs for USSOCOM come from all military 
services.  Each military service has particular guidance and regulations concerning 
contingency contracting operations.  This cross-service diversity can be leveraged 
for best practices; however, current regulations are convoluted and difficult to follow 
for USSOCOM CCOs.  CCOs also operate in an environment that demands support, 
coordination, and expertise of cross-functional capabilities such as finance and 
engineering.  Furthermore, deployed USSOCOM CCOs are under the OPCON of 
other agencies and commands within the AOR.   
One critical area that is split in command is the funding authority afforded to 
USSOCOM CCOs.  USSOCOM uses a special appropriation funding known as 
MFP-11.  This authority is given through Title 10 USC, Section 167, similar to the 
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procuring items/services (including construction) for SOF units.  The rules for this 
special funding are less restrictive than funding provided to the military services in 
terms of speed, review thresholds, and approval requirements.  This allows a level of 
expediency in a CCO’s ability to execute contracts; however, it can also be 
dangerous.  Other functional units operating near the CCOs have been found trying 
to misuse this funding authority by trying to get the CCOs to procure items/services 
for units other than SOF.    
This research has shown that USSOCOM CCOs are located in both austere 
environments and larger, more sustained military installations.  The level of 
interaction and coordination necessary to receive and execute requirements varies.  
Regardless of this fact, a CCO will need to have a close relationship with finance 
and engineering units in order to execute construction requirements.  This research 
has shown that gaps exists in a CCO’s understanding of both financial and 
engineering elements such as funding restrictions and requirement-review boards.  
Research has also shown that current contingency operations display failures in 
interoperability.  These failures suggest splintered responsibilities between agencies 
and a lack of effective interaction between multiple stakeholders.  These failures 
leave CCOs confused and frustrated.   
There are extensive capability gaps addressed within the three categories 
above.  The researcher used these gaps as the catalyst for developing the learning 
objectives for the CM2 prototype.  To best compare these gaps with the appropriate 
learning objectives, the researcher created a coding system.  Table 5 is a coded 
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Table 5. Categorized Capability Gaps 
CODE IDENTIFIED GAPS IN EFFECTIVENSS 
ap1 Inadequate training of personnel associated with executing construction 
requirements 
(CCOs, CORs, SMEs, end-users, requirements-generators) 
ap2 Changes in the acquisition workforce  
(more work, less people) 
ap3 Manning shortages across multiple career fields 
ap4 Lack of appropriate contracting certification prior to deployment 
(Appropriate DAWIA levels) 
ap5 Lack of professional training in construction contracting prior to 
deployment  (DAU courses) 
ap6 USSOCOM CCOs have little to no experience in construction contracting 
ap7 Conflicting regulations and policy for contingency contracting 
(FAR, DFARS, SOFARS, AFFARS, vs. COCOM) 
ap8 Conflicting and confusing standards for construction contracting in a 
contingency environment  
ap9 Inadequate training of oversight personnel (CORs, COTRs,) 
ap10 Inadequate application of existing contracting regulation and policy 
(lack of appropriate clauses, SOW, IGEs, review thresholds, etc.). 
ap11 Inappropriate use of funding authorities. 
ap12 Lack of understanding by CCO of basic construction terminology.  
bp1 Contracting left out of planning process (acquisition and operational). 
bp2 CCO behaving in a re-active way rather than a pro-active way. 
bp3 Increasing expenditures, scope, and magnitude of contractors supporting 
the force on the battlefield. 
bp5 Increased cultural sensitivity concerns. 
bp5 Increased legal ramifications for commanders’ ability to command and 
control personnel in their battlespace.  
bp6 Increased distance from CCO that contracts are being performed. 
bp7 Increased number of oversight personnel (personnel pulled from primary 
mission more often). 
bp8 Lack of adequate training of oversight personnel. 
bp9 Lack of documentation of appointment and training of oversight personnel. 
bp10 Ad-hoc development and execution of the contract-oversight process. 
cp1 Lack of synergistic approach to integrating joint operations  
(lack of integration between military services doctrine, training, skill sets). 
cp2 Lack of coordination between cross-functional areas (finance, engineering, 
legal, contracting, end-user). 
cp3 Misuse of MFP-11 funding authority by CCOs.  
cp4 Lack of awareness of cross-functional requirement review boards. 
cp5 Inadequate interoperability between agencies (DCMA, JCC, USAID). 
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2 Can a Comprehensive Training Module be Developed to 
Effectively Mitigate These Gaps?   
This research suggest that there are extensive areas of concern with the gaps 
in people, processes, and platforms associated with contingency contracting 
construction requirements.  CCOs need a structured management process to bridge 
the gap between their respective military services’ training doctrine, their individual 
skills, and the expectations of commanders on the ground.  USSOCOM leadership 
has expressly articulated a need and desire for a management module mitigating 
these gaps.  Furthermore, this research has discovered that current training 
opportunities (both informal and formal) do not adequately cover dynamic skill sets 
required for effective management of construction requirements.   
A tactical Construction Management Module (CM2) is one method of 
mitigating the gaps discussed.  However, these gaps have strategic implications 
and, thus, also require strategic involvement from USSOCOM staff.  Strategic 
recommendations addressed in Chapter VI include: adapting to the changes in the 
workforce, establishing mandatory training requirements, revisiting lessons learned, 
effectively integrating contracting into planning, developing aggressive oversight 
measures, capitalizing on cross-functional capabilities, and building synergy in joint 
operations.  To adequately fulfill the gaps outlined within this report, both tactical 
level CCOs and strategic level staff members at USSOCOM will need to implement 
and, in time, evaluate the recommendations provided.    
The greatest areas of concern documented in government reports and 
feedback associated with this research included: a lack of integration of contracting 
into all levels of planning (including acquisition and operational planning), 
inadequate requirements-generation procedures, insufficient oversight of work, and 
a failure to use the appropriate funding  and clauses in construction contracts.  The 
CM2 entails guidance and examples to mitigate these concerns.  The CM2 provides 
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strategic alignment, pre-award, award, post-award.   In the module, each of these 
themes will encompass a chapter.  
Table 5 below is a breakdown of the learning objectives within each chapter 
of the CM2 and how they relate to mitigating the listed gaps above.  
Table 6. Learning Objectives of CM2 
GAP 
CODE 
CM2 LEARNING OBJECTIVES (BY CHAPTER) 














3.  Comprehend and apply the special funding authority to USSOCOM. 
ap7, cp1, 
cp2, cp5 
4.  Comprehend the unique command structure and authority in which 
USSOCOM operates around the globe. 





6.  Know where to find and when to apply current approval levels of authority for 
CCOS and Field Operating Officers (FOOs).  
ap6, ap10, 
bp2 
7.  Know when theatre business clearance is applicable for operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  
ap10, bp2 8.  Know current USSOCM policy for MILCON requirements. 
ap11, bp2, 
cp3, cp5 
9.  Comprehend funding concerns within contingency contracting operations. 
ap11, bp2, 
cp3, cp5 






11.  Comprehend responsibilities and limitations with CCO-delegated authorities. 


















15.  Synthesize why CCOs should focus on interoperability with other agencies. 
cp1, cp2, 
cp5 

















20.  Comprehend the key construction clauses to include in solicitations and the 






















25.  Analyze security considerations in distribution and notification elements 














28.  Know where to find the USSOCOM regulation and policy on terminations. 
ap1, ap4, 
ap10, bp6 
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E. Summary 
This chapter analyzed the three overarching pillars of joint contingency 
contracting operations.  First, the pillar of “people” was broken down to reflect the 
acquisition workforce environment and the training and certification elements of 
contingency contracting personnel.  The changing workforce dynamic and manning 
shortages resulted in increases to the acquisition workforce and the creation of a 
new Army Contracting Command.  These changes suggest an increase in the 
number of Army personnel tasked to support contingency contracting—a field in 
which the Army is the lead agent for the two largest active theaters of Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Evidence suggests that the current training of construction contract 
standards and construction terminology is inadequate for USSOCOM CCOs.  
Contract standards such as clauses, SOWs, IGEs, and funding restrictions have 
been misused by CCOs.  There is currently confusion as to which agency regulation 
or policy a USSOCOM CCO should apply.  In addition, CCOs are not currently 
trained in construction terminology, which makes their job more difficult in 
communicating and coordinating with engineers working on construction 
requirements.  
Second, the researcher analyzed the pillar of “processes” to determine how 
contract management policies were effecting USSOCOMO CCOs.  The failure to 
integrate contracting into the acquisition planning processes is a global concern that 
has caused fragmented, reactive behavior on the part of CCOs and their customers.  
Evidence suggests that CCOs and their customers can be more effective if they 
integrate their planning efforts early.  The researcher also analyzed the affect of 
increasing numbers of contractor support on the battlefield.  The increase in 
contractors has complicated both cultural and legal considerations for military 
commanders.  These complications have affected the military commanders’ ability to 
create and execute processes and policies within their theaters.  CCOs must be 
aware of these considerations and be prepared to bridge the expectations of 
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of these manning shortages, training failures, and increased contractor footprint 
within the AOR, the oversight of contractor performing contract requirements has 
suffered.  CCOs have had difficulty in establishing contract management procedures 
that effectively monitor and enforce terms and conditions.  There is evidence to 
suggest that SMEs nominated by the end-users as CORs are often unqualified and 
ill-equipped to perform adequate contract oversight.  This has presented a problem 
as CCOs strive to enforce delegated oversight authorities and, in turn, has increased 
the difficulty for a CCO to enforce the terms and conditions of the contract.    
The final pillar of operations the researcher reviewed was the “platforms” in 
which personnel have been able to execute a synergistic approach to joint 
operations.  This section began by breaking down the diverse cross-service 
regulatory environment in which a CCO operates.  This environment needs 
established contracting standards if CCOs are to integrate the skill set and doctrine 
of individual military services.  The cross-functional environment was then analyzed, 
finding that a CCO must lead the acquisition team through various boards and 
regulations in order to achieve success for all stakeholders.  These stakeholders 
include personnel from various functional areas such as finance, legal, engineering, 
and the operational warfighter.  The CCO must also navigate within an environment 
of splintered responsibilities between various agencies, such as the DCMA, JCC-I/A, 
Army Corp of Engineers, USAID, etc.  These splintered responsibilities among 
stakeholders have resulted in inefficiencies, delays, and frustrations.         
Through the recommendations provided in Chapter VI, the researcher will 
attempt to mitigate these concerns and provide solutions to problems documented 
throughout this analysis of the data. These recommendations include training policy 
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VI. Recommendations 
A. Strategic-Leadership Considerations 
1. (People) Training of Personnel 
a. Adapt to the Changes in the Workforce  
With the unique nature of the special operations mission, there are often 
concerns with utilizing civilians to fill necessary positions.  Yet, there are 
opportunities supporting more sustained operations—such as those at larger bases 
in both Iraq and Afghanistan—at which CCOs could be augmented by a civilian 
workforce. Decision-makers should explore this supplementation of personnel to 
remove a portion of the burden from over-tasked military CCOs.  Depending on the 
deployment arrangement of the civilian positions, this arrangement could also 
provide additional layers of continuity in some locations.   
This report has shown that there is currently a shortfall in both training and 
manning of CCOs across the military services.  Currently, USSOCOM is receiving 
more than 2/3 of its CCOs from the Air Force, although the Army is the lead agent 
for the ongoing major contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
USSOCOM is a joint organization, and while utilizing the best trained and equipped 
personnel to accomplish its mission is critical, bringing in other military services will 
provide the US with a stronger, more effective force in the long-term.  Currently, data 
shows that the Air Force is the best trained and equipped military service for 
developing effective CCOs; however, the Army has made great strides in this area 
with the creation of the Army Contracting Command. In addition, both the Navy and 
Marine Corps are improving the training and experience of their personnel.  The 
researcher recommends that USSOCOM take an aggressive approach in requesting 
additional personnel from the Army to fill USSOCOM taskings in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, since the Army is the lead agency for contingency contracting in both 
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sustained locations and deploying them to locations with higher numbers of 
experienced CCOs to provide on-site assistance as necessary.  Contingency 
Contracting is a learning-intensive field; however, it also demands a great deal of 
flexibility and adaptability from its members.  This flexibility and adaptability can’t be 
learned in a classroom; thus, deploying CCOs into the battlefield environment is the 
most opportune way to build their experience.   
b. Establish Mandatory Training Requirements 
Current USSOCOM SOPs require CCOs to have completed both DAWIA 
Level II contracting certification and the DAU Construction Contracting (CON 244) 
course prior to filling a USSOCOM tasking.  These requirements are sometimes 
waived due to the high operations tempo and priority of taskings.  This researcher 
recommends that the mission of USSOCOM contracting will be better achieved by 
enforcing a firm policy for CCOs to be level II contracting certified, to have 
completed DAU courses Contingency Contracting (CON 234) and Construction 
Contracting (CON 244) and to review the CM2 prior to being assigned to a 
USSOCOM tasking.    This limitation could hinder filling taskings in the short-run.  A 
way to mitigate shortfalls in this area is to effectively communicate to the military 
Services that in order for personnel to fill a USSOCOM tasking, they must have such 
training.  By funding such training, decision-makers would ensure more personnel 
will obtain it in a timely manner. In addition, a cross-command or cross-services 
Memorandum of Understanding would also help ensure this new requirement is met.   
The researcher recommends USSOCOM extend the current single day pre-
deployment training to at least three days, and provide it before CCOs deploy for 
their respective AORs.  A more robust in-house training would provide ample time to 
review USSOCOM-specific regulations and procedures and would help better 
prepare CCOs for the dynamic missions on which they are about to embark.  This 
extended time would be a great opportunity to reinforce those areas in which CCOs 
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c. Revisit Lessons Learned 
Currently, all CCOs are required to complete and submit AARs at the end of 
their deployments.  This is a worthy policy; however, there is no policy officially 
addressing what is to be done with those reports. The researcher recommends 
having newly tasked CCOs review the AARs posted on USSOCOM contracting 
portal and submit a one-page summary of common trends noted in the filled AARs 
for their respective AOR.  In addition, the CCOs should provide their recommended 
solutions to recurrent problems prior to departure from pre-deployment training.  This 
policy will ensure that new CCOs have reviewed conditions within their respective 
AORs and will yield additional solution sets for USSOCOM leadership to consider. 
2. (Processes) Contract Management Policy 
a. Better Integration of Contracting Into Planning 
Integration of contracting into planning can be completed at all levels.  
Contracting leadership can discuss logistical movements and operational objectives 
with other functional leaders.  These discussions can provide the contracting 
leadership (CoCO, CCO, or staff member) an opportunity to recommend sound 
business advice and an acquisition plan to support those movements and objectives.  
In communicating with contracting leadership, strategic-level planners can help the 
individual CCO to better prepare for and execute new requirements. A pro-active 
approach to engaging contracting has benefits at all stages of the acquisition.  A 
process of early engagement also provides an opportunity to appoint and train 
qualified CORs.  The appointment of a COR at the beginning of the acquisition cycle 
can increase his/her commitment and ensure the COR has time to become familiar 
with the requirement.  This policy change  is only effective if both contracting and 
end-user leadership agree that only qualified CORs will be nominated by the end-
user and accepted by the CCO.  The strategic importance of contracting must be 
aggressively stressed to foster a pro-active engagement of operational leaders with 
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effectively enforce his/her authority.  When a CCO must react to the ad-hoc behavior 
of customers, it presents an environment in which sound business advice and 
responsible contract management is more difficult to achieve. The researcher 
recommends the Yoder Three Tier model (Figure 11) as a direct and comprehensive 
approach to achieving integration.  “Several notable requests for better planning, 
coordination and integration of contracting operations with broader theater-support 
elements […] have been postulated” (Yoder, 2004, p. 13).  Prominent calls for better 
planning and integration include, but are not limited to: Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 56 entitled Managing Complex Contingency Operations; the RAND 
Report on Civil and Military Cooperation, and NPS publications (Yoder, 2004; 
Coombs, 2004; Anderson & Flaherty, 2003). 
PDD 56 was issued by President Clinton in 1997. This directive determines 
the integration of planning and execution among Federal agencies called to support 
in contingencies. The problem with PDD 56 is two-fold (Yoder, 2004). First, PDD 56 
is not embraced by the current administration. Second, PDD 56 does not apply to 
combat operations. A 1998 RAND Report authored by Pirnie, Civilians and 
Soldiers—Achieving Better Coordination, proposed greater integration, and 
identification of stakeholders in contingency operations. In addition, “The Yoder 
three-tier model maximizes effectiveness and efficiency of  theatre contingency 
contracting operations, and directly links operations to COCOM broad objectives 
through integrative planning and execution” (Yoder, 2004, p. 14). Each tier of the 
model performs unique functions and requires specific education, developed skill 
sets, and unique personnel and manpower characteristics.  The principle elements 
of the Yoder Three Tier model are broken down below and summarized in Figure 11: 
(1) Ordering Officer Model  
The most basic and simplistic level is the “ordering officer” model. This is the 
most rudimentary level of contracting support, which includes functions such as 
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interactive engagement with experienced personnel in the environment and is best 
suited for warranted junior officers and junior enlisted personnel. 
(2)  Leveraging Contracting Officer Model   
The next higher level is the “leveraging contracting officer” model. This level 
includes the basic ordering functions of the ordering officer model, but includes 
leveraging the capacities and capabilities of the local and regional economies in the 
contingent theater.  The practitioner in the leveraging model will be engaged in 
interfacing with local and regional businesses, creating business processes, and 
potentially coordinating with higher military, Non-governmental Organizations and 
Private Volunteer Organizations (NGO/PVO) and political organizations. Thus, only 
higher-level, more qualified and capable practitioners should perform in the leverage 
model. A shortfall of this model is that the CCO may or may not be integrated with 
the broader goals of national and theater objectives. In the worst case, some of the 
tactical execution may actually be counter to those higher-level goals. 
(3) The Integrated Planner and Executor Model  
The highest level is the “Integrated Planner and Executor” (IPE) model. This 
model takes the leveraging contracting officer function one giant step forward. In this 
model, well-educated and qualified CCOs are integrated into the operational-
planning phases of contingencies—often before actual troop deployment; they then 
make the transition to operations. The hallmark of this model is that contingency 
contracting operations may be planned and subsequently executed to meet National 
Strategic and theater objectives. Additionally, the myriad NGOs and PVOs—which, 
in many cases, are essential to the overall efficiency, effectiveness, and success of 
operations—can be integrated into the planning and execution of contingency 
operations. While this integration requirement may seem obvious, the integrated 
planning and execution among warfighters, CCOs, and the NGOs and PVOs is not; 
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Through this model, the IPE CCO can be utilized in a broader planning-and-
execution role. The CCO, with higher-level certification, education and experience, 
should be integrated within the J-4 and J-5 logistics and planning/operations and 
exercise organization structure. Integration is essential to achieve desired synergies 
between the myriad organizations operating in contingency environments. 
Operational planners can also leverage integration of all theater players (military, 
NGOs/PVOs, and contractors) to achieve harmony between National Security 
Strategy (NSS), Combatant Commander (COCOM), and significant NGOs’ and 
PVOs’ objectives. This integrated planning, exercising, and execution may: help in 
eliminating competing (and often conflicting) demands of the participants, closely 
marry acquisition support with stated objectives, allow for the creation of robust 
contingency contract support plans, and integrate such plans into broader 
operational plans in support of theater operations.  The higher-order IPE calls for the 
most highly educated and seasoned planners and operational/theater-level planners 
(Yoder, 2004).  
The Yoder Three Tier Model can be implemented in a contingency theatre 
regardless of the military service being employed and is perfect for utilization within 
the USSOCOM concept of operations.  The Yoder Three Tier Model will allow for 
better acquisition planning and coordination of tactical, operational, and theater 
objective support to the warfighter.  The successful utilization of this conceptual 
model involves several functional areas; therefore, the broadest dissemination and 
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YODER THREE TIER MODEL 
Model Tier Level & Model Title Functions/Education/Rank Highlights and Drawbacks 
Ordering Officer—Tier One 
• basic ordering 
• some simplified 
acquisitions 
• training: DAU CON 234 
• DAWIA Certified CON 
Level I or II 
• junior to mid-enlisted, 
junior officers, GS-7 to GS-9; 1102 
series civilians 
• simple buys 
• little integration 
• no operational planning 
• no broad liaison functions 
Leveraging Contracting 
Officer—Tier Two 
• leverages to local 
economy 
• reduces “pushed” material 
support 
• training/education: 
• DAU CON 234, recommended 
higher education 
• DAWIA Certified CON Level II-III 
• senior enlisted, junior to 
mid-grade officers, GS-11+ 
1102 series civilians 
• better local operational 
planning 
• some integration 
• more capability for the 
operational commander 
• no planned theater 
integration 
• no broad liaison functions 
• may perform to optimize 
local operations at the detriment to 
theater ops 
Integrated Planner and 
Executor (IPE)—Tier Three 
• highest level of planning 
and integration—joint 
• linked/integrated with J-4/ J-5 
• creates and executes 
OPLAN CCO strategy 
• provides direction to tier 
two and one 
• links operations 
strategically to theater 
objectives of COCOM 
• education: Master’s degree 
or higher and, JPME 
Phase I and II 
• DAWIA Certified CON 
Level III, and other DAWIA 
disciplines (LOG, ACQ, 
FIN, etc) 
• senior officers (0-6+), 
senior civilians, GS-13+, SES 
• performs operational and 
theater analysis, integrates 
results into OPLAN 
• links between COCOM and 
OPLAN   to theater contracting 
operations  
• coordinates theater objectives 
with best approach to contracted 
support 
• can achieve broader national 
security goals through effective 
distribution of national assets 
• includes planning, 
communication, 
coordination, and 
exercising with NGO and 
PVO in theater 
 
Figure 11. Yoder Three Tier Model 
 (Yoder, 2004, p. 17) 
b. Stress Ethical and Cultural Considerations 
Based on the data collected, USSOCOM is doing very well dealing with the 
increased number of contractors on the battlefield.  The researcher recommends 
that this area be noted as a best practice for USSOCOM contracting operations and 
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c. Develop Aggressive Oversight Measures   
Oversight of contracts is critical to the success of military operations (USA, 
2007).  This oversight not only involves contracting personnel, but other functional 
areas—most notably the end-user for the respective requirements.  The researcher 
recommends USSOCOM develop an aggressive policy that builds commitment and 
accountability from both CCOs and the end-users in the field.  A contract is only as 
good as the outcome it provides.  If a CCO does everything right in developing the 
contract document and subsequent statement of work, yet the government provides 
insufficient oversight and coordination during the performance of the contract, the 
efforts in planning and development of the contract may be weakened.  This policy 
should include the integration of current and future COR training and appointment 
procedures. The current practice of CORs as an additional duty presents a problem 
ensuring accountability of the CCOs delegated authority.  CCOs and their leadership 
must engage with operational units to stress the importance of oversight and 
accountability.  The researcher recommends that, in addition to building a robust 
training program for CORs, that CCOs actively and aggressively enforce the 
authorities (and lack of authorities) delegated to the CORs (or similarly titled 
oversight professional, SME, COTR, etc.).  If CORs do not fulfill their duties, the 
researcher suggests there must be a process in place to hold them accountable or, if 
necessary, to replace them with another COR.  This is likely to increase tension 
among CCOs and end-users; however, with adequate top cover from leadership, 
this practice will provide more effective oversight in time.     
3. (Platform) Synergistic Approach  
a. Capitalize on Cross-Functional Capabilities 
This report outlined the various functional capabilities that make up joint 
support operations.  There are many dynamic conditions that warrant coordination 
and execution across all functional areas.  USSOCOM has an opportunity to 
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develop a clear and agreed-upon definition for the roles and responsibilities of each 
of these functions.  This may mean extracting definitions already delineated in 
existing regulations. By including these roles in a clear policy document, decision-
makers will provide a backdrop to increased accountability and understanding in the 
future.   
The researcher recommends the use of bulk funding requirements in certain 
AORs.  Finance, engineering, and contracting personnel should be able to 
consolidate and leverage certain requirements that can be easily forecasted. This 
consolidation leads to decreased lead times of supplies and can reduce the 
procurement lead time needed to execute contract awards for such requirements. 
Bulk funding also minimizes the number of accounting line options and, in turn, 
minimizes errors or violations in the use of those various accounting lines.       
This report detailed the number of cross-service authority and regulation 
concerns that a CCO must juggle in the expeditionary environment. Since changing 
exceptions, policies, and procedures are the norm, the researcher recommends a 
certain degree of standardization. USSOCOM has a vast array of policy letters, 
reach-back opportunities, and published self-help-type items to assist CCOs with 
navigating the cross-functional and cross-service world. The researcher 
recommends the development of a snapshot view of the major items that differ 
between military services and how those differences are enacted within USSOCOM 
operations. Where feasible, these items should be standardized and indoctrinated 
into USSOCOM published policy and training documents.   
b. Build Synergy in Joint Operations   
The researcher recommends that USSOCOM leadership set an operational 
mindset of utilizing all resources available to a CCO in his or her execution of 
contingency contracting requirements. Nowhere else is this synergy more important 
than in the construction requirement arena. A basic construction requirement 
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security forces need to be concerned with pass, identification, and security concerns 
of workers accessing the base.  Military intelligence needs to be concerned with 
problems associated with the possible access to information while on the base, as 
well as any intelligence information they may be able to learn from the contracted 
workers. Finance leaders need to be concerned with the structure of payments for 
the job, be it incremental at progress points, cash pick-up, or electronic based 
payments. Engineering leaders need to be concerned with the layout, design, 
stability, and footprint of the supported infrastructure. Contracting leaders need to be 
concerned with the accountability and stewardship of taxpayers’ money and with the 
socio-economic implications of a project. The base commander needs to be 
concerned with command and control of personnel within his AOR, including 
contract workers on the base. Medical personnel need to be aware of conditions of 
disease or injury associated with workers on the base and their responsibilities if 
construction workers off base are injured while associated with supported projects in 
the local area.   
These functional areas are made up of joint service personnel with varying 
degrees of objectives, priorities, and command structures that have contract 
management concerns. By bringing the key personnel within these functional areas 
to the table and ensuring support to contract-related concerns, decision-makers can 
better prepare all personnel to not only handle unplanned events, but to provide for a 
more effective operation in which communication and integration of personnel is 
fluid. An example of this would be the close coordination of finance and contracting 
in paying activities. Finance may have certain requirements for contractors to get 
paid in cash—including face-to-face secure transactions or established bank 
accounts in a particular region. If contracting leadership is aware of these 
requirements, it can communicate them to the contractor and better prepare the 
contractor at the time of award to ensure establishment of the necessary accounts or 
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B. Tactical-Construction Management Module (CM2) 
The researcher recommends developing and distributing the CM2 IAW the 
following chapter structure. A pilot version of this module, developed as part of this 
recommendation, can be found in the Construction Management Handbook,      
NPS-CM-10-010.   
1. Operational Framework 
A. OVERVIEW 
B. CONTRACTING OFFICER RESPONISBILITIES 
C. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 1.  USSOCOM PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY 
 2.  CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING CELL 
 3.  COMMAND STRUCTURE 
D. CONTRACT REVIEW 
1.  REVIEW POLICY 
2.  THEATRE BUSINESS CLEARANCE 
a. POLICY 
b. CONTENTS FOR REVIEW PACKAGES 
E. FUNDING 
1. USSOCOM MILCON POLICY 




  3. FUNDING SOURCES 
  4. ECONOMY ACT 
   a. CONTRACT OFF-LOADING 
   b. DETERMINATION AND FINDINGS 
   c. CONTRACTING SUPPORT 
   5. MILITARY INTERDEPARTMENTAL PR 
    a. ACCEPTANCE 
    b. CCO ROLE 
   6. BULK FUNDING 
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    a. EMERGENCY & EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSE 
    b. OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION FUNDS 
    c. CINC INITIATIVE FUNDS 
    d.   HUMANITARIAN CIVIC ASSISTANCE  
   8. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 
    a. DAMAGED OR DESTROED FACILITIES 
    b. CONTINGENCY AUTHORITY 
     (1) Declaration of War or national emergency 
     (2)  Emergency construction 
     (3) Contingency construction 
   9. CERP     
a. PURPOSE 
    b. USES 
    c. LIMITATIONS 
    g. GUIDELINES 
    e. KEY TAKE-AWAYS 
  F. DELEGATED CONTRACTING AUTHORITY 
   1.   CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVES (COR) 
   2. CONTRACTING OFFICER’S TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE 
    a. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY (COR & COTR) 
    b. LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY (COR & COTR) 
    c. APPOINTMENT AND TRAINING 
   3. FIELD ORDERING OFFICE (FOO) 
    a. GOVERING REGULATION 
    b. PURPOSE 
    c. POLICY 
    d. GUIDELINES 
    e. KEY TAKE-AWAYS 
   4. PROVISIONAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT) 
    a. PURPOSE 
    b. POLICY 
   5. PROJECT PURCHASING OFFICER (PPO) 
    a. PURPOSE 
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 2. Strategic Alignment 
  A.  SYNERGISTIC APPROACH 
   1. JOINT ACQUISITION REVIEW BOARD (JARB) 
   2. ENGINEERING 
    a. JOINT FACILITY UTILIZATION BOARD (JFUB) 
    b. FACILITIES ENGINEERING TEAM (FET) 
    c. JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY ENGINEERING BOARD 
  B. INTRA-AGENCY COORDINATION 
  C. OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
 3. Pre-Award 
  A. ACQUISITION PLANNING 
  B. ESTABLISHING ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
  C. REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION 
  D. OVERSIGHT PROGRAM 
  E. SOLICIATION DOCUMENTS 
  F. KEY CONSTRUCTION CLAUSES 
  G. DRAWINGS 
  H. EVALUATION PROCEDURES 
 4. Award 
  A.  SOURCE SELECTION 
  B.  DOCUMENTATION 
   1. TECHNICAL EVALUATIONS 
   2. ABSTRACT 
   3. PRICE REASONABLENESS 
   4. DETERMINATION AND FINDING 
   5. PROFESS SCHEDULE 
   6. NOTICE TO PROCEED 
  C. DISTRIBUTION 
 5. Post-Award 
  A.  SAFETY 
  B. SITE VISITS 
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   1.  CHANGES CLAUSE 
   2. DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS 
   3. CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE 
   4. FIELD CHANGE 
  D. PROGRESS MONITORING 
   1.  TYPES OF DELAYS 
   2. DOCUMENTATION 
  E. INVOICES 
   1.  PAYMENTS UNDER FIXED PRICE CONSTRUCTION 
   2. REASONS FOR WITHHOLDING 
  F. TERMINATIONS 
  G. FINAL ACTIONS 
  H. CONCLUSION 
 
C.   Summary  
This chapter outlined the recommendations as a result of this research.  
These ten recommendations provide strategic implications with the people, 
processes, and platforms of USSOCOM Contracting.  The specific strategic 
recommendations include the following: (People) adapt to the changing workforce, 
establish mandatory training requirements, and revisit lessons learned; (Processes) 
better integrate contracting into the planning process using the Yoder Three Tier 
model, stress ethical and cultural considerations, and develop aggressive oversight 
measures; (Platforms) capitalize on cross-functional capabilities and build synergy in 
joint operations.  By implementing these recommendations, decision-makers will 
provide for more effective CCO operations while supporting the objectives of 
commander in the field.  The researcher’s tactical recommendation is simply to 
implement and evaluate the CM2 within the USSOCOM AOR.  This recommendation 
will increase CCO effectiveness and provide a useful tool for CCOs across all levels 
of experience.  Chapter VII will conclude this research report by addressing the 
research questions, stating the limitations to study, and identifying areas of future 








Through the NPS Acquisition Research Program, USSOCOM leadership 
expressed a need for a management module enabling its CCOs to better execute 
construction requirements in a contingency theatre of operations.  In order to 
appropriately craft such a module, the researcher analyzed the existing operational 
environment to determine the appropriate content and focus areas to include in the 
module.  This report began by introducing the background of contingency 
contracting and how it relates to USSOCOM.  As a leader in front-line asymmetric 
threat operations, USSOCOM has increased its presence around the world in 
support of the GWOT.  Its mission demands flexibility and adaptability at the highest 
extent allowable under the law.  CCOs supporting this mission are often looked upon 
as logistics facilitators, business advisors, resource managers, and general tactical 
experts in achieving contractual requirements and arrangements supporting the 
USSOCOM mission.  As key enablers of this mission, CCOs are often asked to fulfill 
construction contract requirements in austere locations with little or no training in 
construction terminology and concepts.  This lack of expertise poses a problem for 
the command.  In addition, construction requirements often are dynamic and 
complex and demand integration between engineering, legal, finance, contracting 
and operations units.   
CCOs supporting USSOCOM missions are often in austere conditions, with 
little or no contact with the larger regional or theatre-wide contracting centers.  They 
are also under OPCON of other agencies and commands within the AOR.  This 
situation presents a unique dynamic in which a CCO must use specific regulations 
and contract warrant authority of one command, while supporting the operational 
objectives of a particular geographical combatant commander on the ground.  A 
cross-functional and joint-force environment further compounds this problem 
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regulations, procedures, doctrines, and objectives.  The interaction of these various 
forces can be combined to create an effect greater than the sum of their individual 
effects. In other words, cooperative interaction among the individual cross-functional 
and joint-force members can create enhanced effectiveness greater than the sum of 
their individual effectiveness. This process is commonly known as synergy.   A more 
synergistic approach to how CCOs manage requirements is needed to effectively 
integrate the capabilities of both the joint-force environment and cross-functional 
areas of the acquisition team (such as finance, engineering, legal, logistics, and the 
operational unit requesting contractual support). Creating this synergy is not easy; 
CCOs need a structured management process to bridge the gaps between their 
respective military services’ training doctrine and their individual skills, as well as the 
expectations of commanders on the ground.   
1. The Gaps in “People”   
This research suggests that there are systemic problems with the training 
personnel assigned to execute construction requirements.  These personnel include 
both the acquisition workforce and operational units tasked with developing and 
overseeing their requirements.  The researcher discovered during this research that 
most USSOCOM CCOs have little to no construction experience and yet find 
themselves as the lead CCO for construction requirements.  In addition, the 
contingency environment presents numerous conflicting regulations and policies for 
which a uniform standard for USSOCOM does not exist.  This lack of uniformity 
exists in both contracting policies and construction standards.   
USSOCOM staff inspections suggested that CCOs’ biggest shortfalls in 
following contract standards involve: lack of the appropriate clauses in construction 
contracts, inadequate training of oversight personnel, and a lack of awareness of 
funding restrictions and review thresholds for construction projects.  Questionnaire 
respondents and interviewed informants further identified other shortfall areas, 
including: failure to reference current regulations, lack of templates for assisting in 
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construction contracting, and a lack of understanding of basic construction 
terminology used by end-users and contractors.  Finally, contingency contracting 
lessons learned are compiled at various levels of command.  These lessons learned 
often reflect recurring problems throughout the same locations over time.  This 
research suggests a failure to adequately integrate these lessons learned in current 
training programs.     
2. The Gaps in “Processes” 
This research suggests that the way in which contract management policy is 
handled throughout the contingency environment is inadequate for achieving 
optimum effectiveness.  To begin with, contracting has been historically left out of 
the planning process in terms of acquisition and operational planning.  This 
inadequacy has lead CCOs to a reactive approach to executing contract 
management policies and processes.   
The failure to integrate contracting was magnified when the DoD increasingly 
relied on contractors to support battlefield objectives.  Over the last ten years, this 
reliance has increased in expenditure, scope, and magnitude.  CCOs are often not 
physically at the location where a contract is performed.  This leads to increased 
numbers of CORs to oversee the work and coordinate with contractors.  The 
documented failures in oversight discovered by the researcher ranged from a lack of 
adequate appointment documentation and of oversight personnel training to the 
government’s inability to provided oversight personnel.  This research suggests that 
oversight control is complex in a contingency theatre; yet, mission success or failure 
is often dependent on effective oversight of contracts.  With conflicting guidance and 
policy in the area of oversight, CCOs and their delegated representatives often 
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3.. The Gaps in “Platform” 
This research suggests that the lack of a synergistic approach to joint 
operations has hindered CCOs’ ability to effectively perform in a contingency 
environment.  Personnel tasked with the role of a CCO for USSOCOM come from all 
military services.  Each military service has particular guidance and regulation 
concerning contingency contracting operations.  This cross-service diversity can be 
leveraged for best practices; however, current regulations are convoluted and 
difficult to follow for USSOCOM CCOs.  CCOs also operate in an environment that 
demands support, coordination, and expertise of cross-functional capabilities such 
as finance and engineering.  One critical area that exhibits this split-in-command 
structure is in the funding authority afforded to USSOCOM CCOs.  USSOCOM uses 
a special appropriation funding known as MFP-11.  This authority is given through 
Title 10 USC, Section 167, and is similar to the authority given to military services.  
The authority is allowed only when CCOs are procuring items/services (including 
construction) for SOF units.  Other functional units operating near the CCOs have 
been found trying to misuse this funding authority by trying to get the CCOs to 
procure items/services for units other than SOF.    
This research has shown that gaps exists in CCOs’ understanding of both 
financial and engineering elements such as: funding restrictions and requirement 
review boards.  Research has also shown that current contingency operations 
display failures in interoperability.  These failures suggest splintered responsibilities 
between agencies and a lack of effective interaction between multiple stakeholders.  
These failures leave CCOs confused and frustrated.   
B. Limitations/Validity of Study 
1. Access to Data   
The biggest challenge to research associated with this project was 
communicating effectively with the appropriate personnel to gain the most insight 
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extremely accommodating. However, due to mission constraints and operations 
tempo, it was often hard for the researcher to track down to right person for the right 
data.  Specifically, it was difficult for the researcher to track down SOF end-users 
and the CENTCOM theater Chief of Contracting for interviews.  However, the study 
was augmented by USSOCOM leadership’s aggressive support through access to 
personnel and documentation.  Another concern of the research was avoiding 
classified discussion that did not relate to the objectives of the report.  In order to 
access information relating to USSOCOM deployments, there is a certain degree of 
risk in discussing and disclosing classified information.  The researcher’s security 
clearance information had to be transferred between NPS and USSOCOM security 
personnel prior to any access to information. This was a relatively smooth process 
that paid dividends during travel for on-site interviews.   
2. Limitations in Recording Interviews  
The security procedures and lack of computer access in SOCOM facilities 
posed a minor challenge during the on-site interviews due to the policy of no 
removable electronic data storage devices (flash drives), no digital records, and no 
e-mail access.  This challenge was mitigated by written documentation of interviews 
and follow-up e-mail/phone communication prior to inclusion of data within the 
report. 
3. Qualitative Methods is Inherently Interpretive 
 The information obtained within this research was used to suggest behavior 
of outcomes as a result of literature review or informant testimony.  Much of this 
information is subjective in nature and cannot be tied to an objective qualitative 
interpretation measure.   
4. Inability to Test the Effectiveness of Recommendations 
 Although the ADDIE method includes an evaluation phase, a true 
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this time.  Future research could go back and evaluate the strategic and tactical 
recommendations, to include the CM2.   
 C. Recommendations for Future Research 
1. Test the Effectiveness of the Recommended CM2. 
Time constraints do not allow the researcher to follow a subsequent 
USSOCOM implementation plan for the CM2.  Thus, the researcher did not have 
time to adequately test the effectiveness of the fielded module.  Future researchers 
could continue to execute the ADDIE model by analyzing the implementation of the 
module and evaluating its effectiveness once fielded to CCOs.  Future researchers 
could also explore evaluation methods in the Four Levels of Evaluation, by Donald 
Kirkpatrick (Kirkpatrick, 1994).  The method referred to in this book is more of a 
standalone evaluation protocol in which the researcher would test the reaction, 
learning, transfer of knowledge, and results of training in terms of return on 
investment (time or money).     
2. Should a DoD-Wide Joint Regulation Established For 
Contingency Contracting Operation?  
This research suggests that DoD contingency contracting operations are 
conducted around the world.  Currently, each military service has different 
regulations and policies.  Many subordinate commands within those services have 
additional or adjusted regulations and policies that differ with the region, command, 
or assignment in which the CCO operates.  There are increasing joint regulations 
that deal with contingency operations of all forces, as well as informal guidance in 
the Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook developed by AFLMA (2008).  Future 
research could analyze the feasibility of developing a DoD-wide joint regulation 
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3. Are There Systemic Ethical Failures in CCO Behavior? 
The researcher did not find (nor this study discuss) any potential significant 
cases of fraud or failure of CCOs to display ethical behavior in the contingency 
environment.  In the past, there have been documented cases of such behavior, 
predominately among Army CCOs (USA, 2007).  Future research could examine the 
change in culture and behavior among Army CCOs since published accounts such 
as the Gansler Report.  
4. Should a USSOCOM Contingency Contracting Battalion be 
Established? 
Through discussions with USSOCOM policy and staff officers, the researcher 
learned there has been informal debate over whether or not a Contingency 
Contracting Battalion should be established at USSOSOM to focus more attention 
on contingency contracting operations within its AOR.  The establishment of a new 
Contingency Contracting Battalion could potentially result in changes to the JMD and 
to the tasking of CCO deployments for USSOCOM operations.  Future research 
could explore the feasibility and effect of establishing such a battalion.   
5. Should more USSOCOM Pre-deployment CCO Training be 
Conducted? 
This report found serious and systematic shortfalls in training through the 
acquisition and contracting field.  The researcher asked USSOCOM personnel 
during interviews and subsequent questionnaires if additional pre-deployment CCO 
training should be conducted at USSOCOM Headquarters.  Currently, CCOs spend 
one day onsite with SOAL-KCC personnel reviewing the policies and background 
information associated with their deployment.  The feedback was split on the benefit 
of extending this training to one week.  Additional research could be conducted to 
determine the feasibility of such training, what exactly it should entail, and how it 
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6. Should Current USSOCOM Procurement Authority be Re-
evaluated? 
The USSOCOM commander has unique procurement authorities and 
responsibilities over that of COCOMs.  Similar to the authorities granted to each 
military service, Title 10 USC, Section 167 grants the USSOCOM commander the 
responsibility and authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar 
equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the 
authority to execute funds.  USSOCOM uses special appropriation funding known as 
Major Force Progam-11 (MFP-11) to support the development, acquisition, and 
sustainment activities for USSOCOM.  This authority is delegated down to the 
USSOCOM Acquisition Executive (SOAE), Mr. James W. Cluck, as the Senior 
Procurement Executive for the command.  He leads the Special Operations 
Acquisition and Logistics Center (SOAL) in executing USSOCOM funding authority 
(Cluck, 2009).  Since actual OPCON over CCOs is provided by the commands in 
which they operate, there is debate that the procurement authority should fall within 
the responsibility and accountability of those commands.  Further research could be 
accomplished to evaluate options associated with maintaining CONUS acquisition 
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Appendix 1.  CCO Questionnaire 
PURPOSE:  This questionnaire was developed for Contingency Contracting 
Officers (CCOs) who have (or are currently) deployed under a United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) billet with experience dealing with infrastructure 
requirements (all construction requirements and those services in direct support of 
infrastructure activities such as gravel deliveries/concrete batch plant operations, 
etc.). The purpose is to explore challenges associated with a CCO’s ability to 
support infrastructure requirements in expeditionary environments. This information 
is being gathered in conjunction with other research concerning the development of 
an infrastructure handbook for USSOCOM CCOs. Your input is critical to crafting an 
effective, viable product.  All responses will remain confidential between the 
informant and the researcher.       
INSTRUCTIONS: Please review the information below and answer each 
question by bolding (electronically) and/or providing feedback as appropriate.  
Answer questions ONLY from the perspective of your experience deployed under 
USSOCOM. Only UNCLASSIFIED information should be included in your 
responses. This questionnaire will be conducted without any form of retribution at 
any level of command. Please feel free to comment at the conclusion of the 
questionnaire on any additional related themes not covered herein. This 
questionnaire will include a follow-up interview/conversation (approx. 30 minutes) 
with the researcher to discuss evolving themes and to clarify or elaborate on ideas 
presented.      
RETURN COMPLETED QUESTIONAIRE TO CMHEARL@NPS.EDU   
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DEMOGRAPHICS:  
GRADE/RANK:     Enlisted  Officer  
SERVICE:      USAF USA USN USMC  
DAWIA CERTIFICATION LEVEL:  I II III 
YEARS IN CONTRACTING:   1-4 4-8 8-12 12-16 16-20 20+ 
CURRENTLY DEPLOYED:   YES  NO 
THEATRE: JCC I/A CENTCOM (non-JCC I/A) AFRICOM OTHER 
NUMBER OF TIMES DEPLOYED IN CONTRACTING: _________________ 
LOCATIONS/DURATION (months):              




CONTACT INFORMATION:  NAME:      ______________________________ 
E-MAIL:     ______________________________ 
PHONE:    ______________________________ 
 
 TRAINING: 
1. Do/did you have at least 1 year experience in construction contracting before you were 
assigned to your last/current deployed CCO construction position in USSOCOM?  
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2. Rate the effectiveness of (all combined) previous CCO training (CON 234, Unit Level, Pre-
deployment, etc). 
1 2 3 4 5 [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness] 
3. Does your unit have recurring CCO training at your home station? If so, how often?   
YES  NO 
WEEKLY MONTHLY ANNUALLY OTHER_________________ 
4. Did your recurring CCO training address infrastructure issues in a deployed environment 
(construction, services, quality assurance, oversight, joint challenges, real 
property/engineering topics, etc.)? 
YES  NO N/A 
5. Did you receive CCO training within 90 days prior to departure on your last deployment?  
YES  NO 
If so, was it helpful?____________      Please explain why/why not below: 
6. Would you find a one-week, comprehensive CCO training with all other CCOs deploying into 
your theatre useful immediately prior to arrival into the AOR on your next deployment? 
YES NO 
If so, what areas do you feel need to be addressed? 
7.   Would you find a training handbook useful to prepare for and/or execute future deployments? 
 YES NO 
8. When supporting infrastructure requirements, what capabilities do you think CCOs need 
improvement on in order to better support their customers and the overall mission?  In other 
words, what do you think CCOs need to be able to do better?  For each improvement, please 
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9. Do you think a comprehensive handbook focused on infrastructure support would effectively 
mitigate these shortfalls in capability? 
YES NO  If so, what items do you feel it should entail? (Specifically) 
 
10. What templates would be beneficial for such a training handbook? (For instance, specific 
SOW/SOOs, drawings, source-selection plans, termination documents, evaluation criteria 
framework, technical evaluation checklist, etc.) 
INTEGRATION: 
11. Rate the effectiveness of acquisition planning prior to your receipt of funded construction 
requirements from your customer.  In other words, have/does your customer typically work with you to 
conduct adequate acquisition planning prior to the funded requirement being presented to you?  Is 
there coordination that takes place between the engineers or applicable end-user and the CCO to 
facilitate an effective solicitation/award?     
Acquisition planning: Defined as the generation of a viable requirement description, market 
research, pro-active vs. re-active planning, writing an adequate statement of objectives/statement of 
work, development of performance measurements, adequately allocated and trained quality 
assurance evaluators/construction inspectors, discussing the need for and development of a quality 
assurance plan, etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness] 
Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned, do not include names of 
those involved. However, use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable.  For each lesson learned, 
please identify the root cause(s). 
  
12. Rate the level of post-award oversight of contract requirements by your customer. 
  Oversight = Coordination with subject-matter experts, timely inspection and acceptance of 
work IAW contract schedule, compliance of government (end-user) responsibilities, 
communication with CCO after award, pro-active monitoring of expiration dates, timely 
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1 2 3 4 5 [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness] 
Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned, please do not include 
names of those involved, use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable.  For each lesson 
learned, please identify the root cause(s). 
 
 
Please feel free to provide any additional comments that you feel would be helpful to better 
position our CCO workforce to enable the warfighter through effective execution of 









FOR QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS: CONTACT CHRIS M. HEARL, CAPT, USAF AT 
CMHEARL@NPS.EDU 
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Appendix 2.  Staff Questionnaire 
PURPOSE: This questionnaire was developed for Contracting Policy and Staff Officers 
who have exposure to or support from Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) deployments 
under United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) billets with experience dealing 
with infrastructure acquisition requirements (all construction and those services in direct 
support of infrastructure activities such as gravel deliveries/concrete batch plant operations, 
etc.). The purpose is to explore challenges associated with a CCO’s ability to support infrastructure 
requirements in expeditionary environments. This information is being gathered in conjunction with 
other research concerning the development of an infrastructure handbook for USSOCOM CCOs. 
Your input is critical to crafting an effective, viable product.  All responses will remain confidential 
between the informant and the researcher.       
INSTRUCTIONS: Please review the information below and answer each question by bolding 
(electronically) and/or providing feedback as appropriate.  Answer questions ONLY from the 
perspective of your experience under USSOCOM. Only UNCLASSIFIED information should be 
included in your responses. This questionnaire will be conducted without any form of retribution at 
any level of command. Please feel free to comment at the conclusion of the questionnaire on any 
additional related themes not covered herein. This questionnaire will include a follow-up 
interview/conversation (approx. 30 minutes) with the researcher to discuss evolving themes and to 
clarify or elaborate on ideas presented.      
 
RETURN COMPLETED QUESTIONAIRE TO CMHEARL@NPS.EDU   
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DEMOGRAPHICS:  
GRADE/RANK:     Enlisted  Officer  
SERVICE:      USAF USA USN USMC  
DAWIA CERTIFICATION LEVEL:  I II III 
YEARS IN CONTRACTING:    1-4 4-8 8-12 12-16 16-20 20+ 
NUMBER OF TIMES DEPLOYED IN CONTRACTING: _________________ 
LOCATIONS/DURATION (months):              




CONTACT INFORMATION:                    
NAME:      ____________________________________ 
E-MAIL:      ___________________________________ 
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CAPABILITIES: 
1. What are all of the required capabilities for executing infrastructure requirements for a CCO 
on a USSOCOM deployment? 
 
2. When supporting infrastructure requirements, what capabilities do you think CCOs need to 
improve in order to better support their customers and the overall mission?  For each 
improvement, what evidence suggests an improvement is necessary? 
 
3. Do you feel a comprehensive training handbook focused on infrastructure support would 
effectively mitigate these shortfalls in capability? 
YES NO  If so, what items do you feel it should entail? (Please be specific.) 
 




5. Are you aware of any infrastructure-centric training initiatives for CCOs deploying to a 
USSOCOM billet? 
YES  NO If not, what initiatives do you feel would benefit CCOs dealing with 
infrastructure requirements? 
 
6. How would you rate the effectiveness of (all combined) CCO training (CON 234, Unit Level, 
Pre-deployment, etc)? 
1 2 3 4 5 [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness] 
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YES  NO 
If so, what topics need to be addressed?  Why do you believe such training would be helpful? 
 
8. Do you feel a one-week, comprehensive CCO training immediately prior to departure into 
their respective AOR would benefit USSOCOM CCOs? 
YES NO 




9. Please discuss any policy/staff initiatives to integrate pre-deployment coordination between 
CCOs and their deployed end-users; this includes memorandums of agreement with other 
units/agencies, tasking coordination, cross-functional training, etc.    
 
10.   Please discuss any leadership initiatives to provide top cover, logistical support, and 
contracting reach-back opportunities for CCOs deploying in support of SOF objectives.   
  
Please feel free to provide any additional comments you feel would be helpful to better 
position our CCO workforce to enable the warfighter through effective execution of infrastructure 
requirements. Continue on next page if applicable. 
  
 
FOR QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS: CONTACT CHRIS M. HEARL, CAPT, USAF AT 
CMHEARL@NPS.EDU 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 131 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Appendix 3.  Customer Questionnaire 
PURPOSE: This questionnaire was developed for Customers and End-users of 
Contracting support from Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) deployments under United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) billets with experience dealing with 
infrastructure acquisition requirements (all construction and those services in direct support 
of infrastructure activities such as gravel deliveries/concrete batch plant operations, etc.). The 
purpose is to explore challenges associated with a CCO’s ability to support infrastructure 
requirements in expeditionary environments. This information is being gathered in conjunction with 
other research concerning the development of an infrastructure handbook for USSOCOM CCOs. 
Your input is critical to crafting an effective, viable product.  All responses will remain confidential 
between the informant and the researcher.       
INSTRUCTIONS: Please review the information below and answer each question by bolding 
(electronically) and/or providing feedback as appropriate.  Answer questions ONLY from the 
perspective of your experience deployed under USSOCOM. Only UNCLASSIFIED information should 
be included in your responses. This questionnaire will be conducted without any form of retribution at 
any level of command. Please feel free to comment at the conclusion of the questionnaire on any 
additional related themes not covered herein. This questionnaire will include a follow-up 
interview/conversation (approx. 30 minutes) with the researcher to discuss evolving themes and to 






RETURN COMPLETED QUESTIONAIRE TO CMHEARL@NPS.EDU   
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DEMOGRAPHICS:  
GRADE/RANK:    Enlisted  Officer  
SERVICE:     USAF USA USN USMC  
CAREER FIELD: ___________________________________________ 
POSITION:  ___________________________________________ 
CURRENTLY DEPLOYED:    YES  NO 
THEATRE: JCC I/A  CENTCOM (non-JCC I/A) AFRICOM OTHER 
HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVE (COR) OR QUALITY 
ASSURANCE EVALUATOR (QAE)? 
YES NO 
DO YOU TYPICALLY DEAL WITH CONTRACTED REQUIREMENTS AND CONTRACTING 
PERSONNEL AT YOUR HOME BASE? 
     YES  NO 











1. Please rate the effectiveness of support you received from CCOs for your infrastructure 
requirements. 
1 2 3 4 5 [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness] 
 
2. Do you feel CCOs supporting you on your SOCOM deployment(s) were competent?   
 




3. Have/do you receive sufficient timely contracting support from CCOs? 




4. During your SOCOM deployment(s), did you get consistent support no matter which CCO 
you worked with, or did you detect significant differences between individual CCOs?  Please explain: 
 








6. What capabilities (areas of knowledge and/or abilities to execute) do you need from a CCO in 
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7. In your experience, what areas have CCOs consistently done well to support your 
requirements? 
 




9. While deployed, has/does your unit leadership have frequent communication with Contracting 
leadership?  (Includes informal coordination and formal established meetings) 
YES  NO DON’T KNOW 
IF SO, HOW OFTEN?  WEEKLY MONTHLY ANNUALLY
 OTHER_________________ 
10. Do you feel CCOs typically understand your mission? 
 YES NO 
11. Has/does your deployed unit ever coordinate with the Contracting Office to bring CCOs to the 
applicable training courses or otherwise integrate Contracting personnel into cross-functional 
teams to better integrate them into your immediate mission needs? 
YES  NO DON’T KNOW 
12. Does your home station unit ever coordinate with the local Contracting Office to bring CCOs 
to the applicable training courses or otherwise integrate Contracting personnel into cross-
functional teams at home stations? 
YES  NO DON’T KNOW 
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14. Rate the effectiveness of acquisition planning prior to your submittal of a funded requirements 
to Contracting.   
In other words, do you typically work with Contracting to conduct adequate acquisition 
planning prior to submitting the paperwork for your requirement? Is there pro-active coordination that 
takes place between you and the CCO to facilitate an effective solicitation/award?     
 
Acquisition planning: Defined as the generation of a viable requirement description, market 
research, pro-active vs. re-active planning, writing an adequate statement of objectives/statement of 
work, development of performance measurements, adequately allocated and trained quality 
assurance evaluators/construction inspectors, discussing the need for and development of a quality 
assurance plan, etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness] 
Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned. Please do not include 
names of those involved, though the use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable.  For each 
lesson learned, please identify the root cause(s). 
 
15. Rate the level of post-award (after contract has been signed and contractor begins work) 
oversight of contract requirements by you/your office. 
 Oversight = Coordination with subject-matter experts, timely inspection and acceptance of 
work IAW contract  schedule, compliance of government (end-user) responsibilities, communication 
with CCO after award, pro-active monitoring of expiration dates, timely submittal of new SOW for 
follow-on contracts, etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness] 
Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned. Please do not include 
names of those involved, though the use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable.  For each 
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16. Do you feel Contracting and your (deployed) organization have capitalized on opportunities to 
work together to better support your operational needs? 
 YES NO Either way, please explain: 
 
17. Do you feel Contracting and your (deployed) organization have capitalized on opportunities to 
work together to better put in place effective contractor support that facilitates successful 
performance of the requirement(s)? 
 YES  NO Either way, please explain: 
  
Please feel free to provide any additional comments that you feel would be helpful to better 
position our CCO workforce to enable the warfighter through effective execution of infrastructure 









FOR QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS: CONTACT CHRIS M. HEARL, CAPT, USAF AT 
CMHEARL@NPS.EDU 
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